Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

Abstract

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent's actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt's famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt's own 'guidance' view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between 'not 8-ing' and 'avoiding 8-ing'.Keywords Frankfurt . Principle of alternate possibilities . Moral responsibility . Free will There is an apparently obvious, if relatively under-discussed 1 , objection to Frankfurt-type (1969, originally) counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (henceforth, the Principle). What's more, as we shall see, this objection is motivated by Frankfurt's own theory of action. The success of Frankfurt-type counterexamples depends, according to this Frankfurtian objection, on the agent's movements in the counterfactual scenario qualifying as her actions. The idea is that if in the counterfactual scenario what happens does not count as the relevant agent's actions (for example because what happens does not qualify as actions, or at least not as that agent's actions), then Frankfurt-type counterexamples fail. . But given the near-to-infinite literature on Frankfurt-type cases (see Fischer 1999a-ten pages of references in a ten-year-old article on 'recent work'!), I think it is fair to say that the objection in question has received relatively little attention.

Aristotle and Double Effect

“…Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the latter extends more widely. For both children and the lower animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts comparing Aristotle to has to say about the case of the drunk, who does not seem to act intentionally under any description, but who will have to be hold responsible for the damage that she might cause (for more on this, see my work in action theory and free will: Di Nucci 2008, Di Nucci 2009, Di Nucci 2010a, Di Nucci 2010b, Di Nucci 2011a, Di Nucci 2011b, Di Nucci 2011c, Di Nucci 2012b, Di Nucci 2013d, Di Nucci 2013e, Di Nucci 2013f, Di Nucci 2014b). 5 Charles revises the third condition twice: "(3)' z is caused by S's desire to do a z-type action either for its own sake or as the means to achieving a further goal which he desires for its own sake… (3)'' z is an action which is caused either by S's desire to do a z-type action (for itself or derivatively) or by his desire to do a y-type action (for itself or derivatively), when S knows that in doing y he is also doing z" (1984: 61).…”

Avoiding and Alternate Possibilities

“…For a more recent survey, see Levy & McKenna 2009. 2 Mention of this kind of move against Frankfurt's counterexample can be found at least in the following places: Fischer (1982), Kane (1985), Widerker (1995), Kane (1996), McKenna (1997, Wyma (1997), Otsuka (1998), Fischer (1999), Woodward (2002), Pettit (2005), Steward (2006), Alvarez (2009), Larvor (2010), Di Nucci 2010a, Di Nucci 2011a, and Di Nucci 2011b Di Nucci 2010a, Di Nucci 2011a, and Di Nucci 2011b Page numbers refer to pre-print. FRAME: Bert has decided to frame Bart.…”

“…9 This paper only replies to Janzen. For my own position on these and related issues regarding agency, free will and responsibility please seeDi Nucci 2008, Di Nucci 2009, Di Nucci 2010a, Di Nucci 2010b, Di Nucci 2011a, Di Nucci 2011b, Di Nucci 2011c, Di Nucci 2012, Di Nucci 2013a, Di Nucci 2013b, and Di Nucci 2014…”