1990
DOI: 10.1080/08826994.1990.10641323
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Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case

Abstract: An American political scientist reviews existing theories of transition from communism to democracy. Novel arguments suggesting that both regimecentered and society-centered theories underplay important factors, including processes of institution-building and redefinition of interests during the transition itself, are advanced and systematized. Included in the presentation are relevant references to the economy, particularly with regard to such aspects of modernization as urban degradation or change in occupat… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The nature and location of these cleavages, however, is different from the types of cleavages most prominent in the advanced democracies. One cannot deny that class and other socioeconomic cleavages matter less today in Eastern Europe than they do in Western Europe, and this discrepancy has to do with the communist past: the operation of egalitarian economic policies and the disaggregation of social resources such as property, education, status, occupation, and wealth inhibited the formation of social classes (von Beyme 1996;Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998;Evans and Whitefield 1993;Remington 1990;Whitefield 1993). But other types of cleavages-such as religion, ethnicity, and urban vs. rural-will undoubtedly persist and continue to have an impact on post-communist electoral behavior (Tworzecki 2003;Whitefield 2002).…”
Section: Cleavage Structuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The nature and location of these cleavages, however, is different from the types of cleavages most prominent in the advanced democracies. One cannot deny that class and other socioeconomic cleavages matter less today in Eastern Europe than they do in Western Europe, and this discrepancy has to do with the communist past: the operation of egalitarian economic policies and the disaggregation of social resources such as property, education, status, occupation, and wealth inhibited the formation of social classes (von Beyme 1996;Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998;Evans and Whitefield 1993;Remington 1990;Whitefield 1993). But other types of cleavages-such as religion, ethnicity, and urban vs. rural-will undoubtedly persist and continue to have an impact on post-communist electoral behavior (Tworzecki 2003;Whitefield 2002).…”
Section: Cleavage Structuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…87 Odom 1992 According to Breslauer 1989, Ill-Ill, Gorbachev followed all the maxims of the Transition to Democracy literature; cf. Hough 1990, Remington 1990and Bova 1991. On the other hand, one might argue that Gorbachev took Huntingtons recommendation (1965,414) too seriously, according to which a strong party may be of general interest because it alone can guarantee a stable frame for transformation.…”
Section: Page 24mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That is, as Soviet citizens became politically socialized during this era, did virtually none of them gain the psychological disposition toward activity that should have been expected of a reasonable sized minority in an urbanized, industrial country such as the USSR? Or, alternatively, IODebates over the degree and direction of value change among Soviet citizens as well as over the reasons behind it continue (Bahry 1993;Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992;Hahn 1991;Reisinger et al 1994;Remington 1990). was the size of the segment psychologically disposed toward political activity roughly comparable to that found in other developed countries without that disposition translating into political behavior? Before Gorbachev coming to power in 1985, the Soviet regime was outwardly united in its opposition to public criticism of its policies and willing to repress those who publicly dissented.…”
Section: Political Change In Post-soviet States 957mentioning
confidence: 99%