Regime type and Data Manipulation: Evidence from the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

Autocratic and democratic leaders have an incentive to misreport data that may reveal policy failure. However, it is easier for autocratic leaders to fabricate data because they are not subject to scrutiny from media, opposition parties, and civil society. This suggests that autocratic governments are more likely to manipulate policy-relevant statistics than democratic governments. It is inherently difficult to test that claim because researchers typically do not have access to data from sources other than the government. The COVID-19 pandemic represents a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between regime type and data manipulation because of its widespread impact, as well as the ability to compare reported with excess deaths and test for statistical anomalies in reported data. Based on regressions for undercounting and statistical irregularities that take into account unintentional mismeasurement, I find that autocratic governments are more likely to deliberately under-report the impact of COVID-19 than their democratic counterparts.