Regional banks and market power: evidence from Indonesia

Trinugroho, Irwan; Sutaryo, Sutaryo; Damayanti, Sylviana Maya; Wiryono, Sudarso Kaderi; Nugroho, Linggar Ikhsan

doi:10.1504/ijmef.2018.092352

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Regional development banks mainly operated in their provinces; therefore, in many cases, they do not directly compete with foreign banks. Subsequently, regional development banks have higher market power than other banks due to their captive markets (Trinugroho et al, 2018). Regarding the effect of foreign presence on overhead cost, the effect only pronounced for state-owned banks meaning that those banks significantly reduce overhead costs to be more competitive following the penetration of foreign banks.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Foreign Banks’ Presence and Domestic Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

Mardiya

Trinugroho

2018

Etikonomi

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We examine the impact of foreign presence on domestic banks’ performance by studying conventional commercial banks in Indonesia. We use monthly financial information of 97 commercial banks from 2003 through 2013 resulting in 8,600 observations. We use a panel data regression (Panel Least Square method) to test our hypotheses. Our results show that overall, foreign presence decreases the performance of domestic banks. Going deeper, we find that foreign presence reduces state-owned banks’ profitability as well as private domestic banks’ profitability. However, there is no significant effect of foreign presence on the performance of regional development banks. Little evidence found on the effect of foreign presence on overhead cost.DOI:10.15408/etk.v17i2.7769

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Foreign Banks’ Presence and Domestic Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

Mardiya

Trinugroho

2018

Etikonomi

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“…O indicador de Lener próximo a 1 indica a capacidade dos bancos brasileiros terem elevados spreads 9 . No entanto, não há correlação entre o indicador de concentração e as características econômicas e sociais das regiões, conforme observado em outros estudos (Trinugroho et al, 2018). Além disso, há diferenças na distribuição espacial entre os indicadores não estruturais (índices CR5 e HHI) e o estrutural (índice de Lener).…”

Section: Concentração Bancária E Custos De Agênciaunclassified

Monopólio Bancário e Espaço: uma análise dos custos de agência e de monitoramento dos bancos no Brasil

Oliveira do Carmo,

Ferreira Santos,

Silva Ribeiro

2024

RBERU

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O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar que o monopólio bancário aumenta os custos de crédito devido às características espaciais do Brasil. A literatura tem centralizado estudos em torno dos impactos do monopólio, porém o espaço também influencia nas condições de financiamento. Isso ocorre porque a dimensão espacial cria custos de agência e monitoramento ao crédito. Diante disso, esta pesquisa apresenta a distribuição regional dos bancos e das micro e pequenas empresas, assim como dos indicadores de concentração do setor bancário. Os resultados conclusivos evidenciam que o poder de monopólio contribui para o distanciamento entre bancos e firmas, bem como entre a sede e as filiais das instituições financeiras. Portanto, a concentração bancária combinada à dimensão espacial tendem a aumentar as restrições de crédito no Brasil.

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“…The farmer makes a decision about the horticulture price to the customer based on the insurance fee from the bank [12]. Second, the bank has higher market power [13] than the farmer [14]. So, a Stackelberg leadership game is formulated.…”

Section: Model Assumptions and Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should Bank Provide Insurance for Horticultural Crop Damage? (A Stackelberg Game Approach)

Januardi,

Hung

2024

IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci.

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This study provides insight for a bank to insure farmers with the possibility of having horticultural crops damaged. Specifically, a Stackelberg leadership game is formulated with the bank as the leader and the farmer as the follower. The bank declares its insurance fee first to anticipate the horticulture prices and maximize its profit. Then, the farmer decides the horticulture price sequentially given the insurance fee and the crop condition. The game is solved under the with and without insurance scenarios. The farmer decides its horticulture price with no banking insurance fee in without insurance scenario. The bank decision-making is only included in with insurance scenario. From the analytical comparison result, it is better for the farmer to have insurance from the bank when the probability of damage to a horticultural crop exists. However, the bank should give an insurance fee to the farmer with a high probability of having good horticultural crops and less customer sensitivity to damaged crops.

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Regional banks and market power: evidence from Indonesia

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Foreign Banks’ Presence and Domestic Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

Foreign Banks’ Presence and Domestic Bank Performance: Evidence from Indonesia

Monopólio Bancário e Espaço: uma análise dos custos de agência e de monitoramento dos bancos no Brasil

Should Bank Provide Insurance for Horticultural Crop Damage? (A Stackelberg Game Approach)

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