Regional Fisheries Management on the High Seas: The Hit-and-Run Interloper Model

McKelvey, Robert; Sandal, Leif Kristoffer; Steinshamn, Stein Ivar

doi:10.1142/s0219198903001070

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Next, this framework is used to develop and test expectations regarding shifts in national policy preferences for several HMS stocks that are managed by the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT; the Commission). Contrary to much of the literature (Barkin & Shambaugh, 1999;McKelvey, Sandal, & Steinshamn, 2003), it is shown here that new entrants, largely from developing countries, can actually increase the likelihood of strong, multilateral management by generating political will in historically dominant countries.…”

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confidence: 99%

Leveraging Competitive Advantages

Webster

2007

The Journal of Environment & Development

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Contrary to expectations, fishing countries have established relatively effective management plans for a few international fisheries. The model described in this article explains how such multilateral regulation can evolve in spite of strong political and economic barriers to cooperation. Qualitative cases from the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas were used to test the model. Although there was not enough political will to maintain stocks at sustainable levels, fishing countries developed successful rebuilding plans for some overfished stocks. Developing countries played a critical role in this arena because the growth of their fleets provided incentives for developed countries to prefer stronger management. When powerful countries with high costs of production began to lose market share under open access, they turned to negotiated access rights in order to protect their fleets. This system also benefited developing countries when they garnered concessions and side payments for their cooperation.

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confidence: 99%

Leveraging Competitive Advantages

Webster

2007

The Journal of Environment & Development

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“…However, whilst undoubtedly an improvement on neoclassical assumptions about Homo economicus , the argument that correct alignment of incentives is the key to successful management outcomes underplays the problem that it is not always possible to align individual and community objectives. As an example of how complicated the alignment of objectives can become, the effectiveness of regional fishery management organizations has been defeated by the complexity of multi‐national interests and by economic incentives that cause a failure to agree on allocation, or deal with new members, free riding and illegal fishing (McKelvey et al. 2003; Tsangardies 2007).…”

Section: Moving Forwardmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management

et al. 2010

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There is broad consensus that the main problem facing fisheries globally is too many boats chasing too few fish. Unfortunately it is also possible to argue that there are too many proposed solutions and not enough practical answers to improving fisheries management. There is a deepening divide between those who propose alternative regulatory controls on fishers, including establishing large areas permanently closed to fishing, and those who argue for better alignment of incentives combined with broad participation of resource users in fishery management decisions (in simple terms, between top down and bottom up systems of governance). However despite the choice of policy instruments used, a consistent outcome is that resource users behave in a manner that is often unintended by the designers of the management system. Hence whilst uncertainty is broadly recognized as a pervasive feature of fisheries management, to date most of the attention has focussed on only part of that uncertainty – scientific uncertainty about the status of exploited resources. The effect of uncertainty generated on the human side of fisheries science and management has received much less attention. However, the uncertainty generated by unexpected resource user behaviour is critical as it has unplanned consequences and leads to unintended management outcomes. Using empirical evidence of unexpected resource user behaviour and reviewing current responses to unexpected management outcomes, we identify different approaches that both improve prediction of human behaviour in fisheries systems and identify management measures that are more robust to these sources of uncertainty. However, unless the micro scale drivers of human behaviour that contribute to macro scale implementation uncertainty are communicated effectively to managers and considered more regularly and in greater depth, unanticipated responses to management actions will continue to undermine management systems and threaten the sustainability of fisheries.

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“…A fish stock may grow and breed as a unit and then be diffused among different national zones. A variant of this is the split-stream model (McKelvey et al 2002(McKelvey et al , 2003. Another possibility is that sub-stocks grow and breed independently in separate locations confined to the zones of different countries but migrate between zones.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individual Rationality and the “Zonal Attachment” Principle: Three Stock Migration Models

Hannesson

2006

Environ Resource Econ

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Shared fish stocks migrate across borders between different countries’ exclusive economic zones. This paper discusses the individual rationality of fish-sharing agreements based on the zonal attachment of such stocks. Three types of migrations are considered: (i) a common stock that grows and reproduces and is then distributed in given proportions between two countries’ zones at the beginning of each fishing season; (ii) sub-stocks that breed and grow independently in their separate zones but spill over between zones according to relative abundance; (iii) a stock that grows and breeds in one country’s zone but migrates into the zone of another if it exceeds a certain size. It is shown that in all these cases the minor partner in a fish-sharing agreement may not have an incentive to cooperate unless he gets a larger share of the cooperative profits than that corresponds to his share of the stock. This is particularly likely to happen when the unit cost of fish does not depend on the stock. An exception could occur if stock migration depends on the stock level; the major partner could then keep the entire stock by fishing it down to a critical level. Copyright Springer 2006Fisheries, 200-mile zone, non-cooperative games, Q22,

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Regional Fisheries Management on the High Seas: The Hit-and-Run Interloper Model

Cited by 14 publications

References 4 publications

Leveraging Competitive Advantages

Leveraging Competitive Advantages

Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management

Individual Rationality and the “Zonal Attachment” Principle: Three Stock Migration Models

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