Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks: An Empirical Study for the European Community

Hagen, Jürgen von; Hammond, George

doi:10.1111/1467-9957.00104

Cited by 62 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Additionally, Table (1) indicates heterogeneous country experiences. For instance, in the case of France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, we notice that the width of fluctuations in transfers over the years is relatively narrow compared to smaller members such as Estonia, Slovakia, and Spain, which confirms previous results by von Hagen and Hammond (1998).…”

Section: -2012supporting

confidence: 89%

On Deficits and Symmetries in a Fiscal Capacity

Hebous

Weichenrieder

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. There is a growing debate about complementing the European Monetary Union by a more comprehensive fiscal union. Against this background, this paper emphasizes that there is a trade-off in designing a system of fiscal transfers ("fiscal capacity") in a union between members of different size. A system cannot guarantee symmetric treatment of members and simultaneously ensure a balanced budget. We compute hypothetical transfers for the Eu- Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: -2012supporting

confidence: 89%

On Deficits and Symmetries in a Fiscal Capacity

Hebous

Weichenrieder

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…von Hagen and Hammond, 1998). In the absence of such a coordination, excessive debt in some countries of the monetary union might cause costs for other members via increased interest rates or might even lead to higher inflation and risks for the external stability of the common currency if the central bank is not willing or able to counteract the expansionary fiscal policies (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999).…”

Section: Public Debt Crises and Macroeconomic Imbalancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt Crises in Europe*

Knedlik

Schweinitz

2012

J of Common Market Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt Crises in Europe AbstractEuropean authorities and scholars published proposals on which indicators of macroeconomic imbalances might be used to uncover risks for the sustainability of public debt in the European Union. We test the ability of four proposed sets of indicators to send early-warnings of debt crises using a signals approach for the study of indicators and the construction of composite indicators. We find that a broad composite indicator has the highest predictive power. This fact still holds true if equal weights are used for the construction of the composite indicator in order to reflect the uncertainty about the origin of future crises.

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“…Therefore, a European Fiscal Transfer System (EFTS) that aims at stabilizing aymmetric shocks in the EMU has been advocated by van der Ploeg (1991) and has been elaborated further by e.g. Italianer et al (1993) and von Hagen (1995). In this section we will include such an automatic stabilization rule into our model and analyze its consequences.…”

Section: Consequences Of a European Federal Transfer Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU

Engwerda

Aarle

Plasmans

2002

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU Engwerda, J.C.; van Aarle, B.; Plasmans, J.E.J. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractIn this paper we analyze the interaction of fiscal stabilization policies in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The "Excessive Deficits" Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty and its elaborations in the recent "Stability and Growth Pact" introduce a set of fiscal stringency requirements on national fiscal policies. Situations might arise where the need for fiscal flexibility and the fiscal stringency requirements will create a conflict and suboptimal macroeconomic policies are implemented. We analyze macroeconomic adjustment under non-cooperative and cooperative fiscal policy design in the EMU using a dynamic games approach. In particular we consider how fiscal stringency requirements like the Stability and Growth Pact affect fiscal policy design under EMU and study the consequences of the introduction of a fiscal transfer mechanism between countries.JEL classification: C7; E6; F4

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Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks: An Empirical Study for the European Community

Cited by 62 publications

References 5 publications

On Deficits and Symmetries in a Fiscal Capacity

On Deficits and Symmetries in a Fiscal Capacity

Macroeconomic Imbalances as Indicators for Debt Crises in Europe*

Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU

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