Regional party system, causal attribution, and economic voting in new democracies: The case of the 2007 Korean presidential election

Abstract

How do citizens in new democracies locate the target of responsibility for economic conditions, and how do political cleavages mediate citizens’ attribution process and their consequences? To answer these important but little-studied questions, this study analyzes the 2007 presidential election in Korea. Primary findings in this study elucidate the need to consider the role of political cleavages in explaining economic voting in new democracies. Specifically, even after controlling for economic salience and voters’ political sophistication, political cleavages (represented by hometown and regional partisanship) exercise a clear and significant influence on voters’ attribution process and their electoral choices. Thus, in new democracies, in particular in Korea, the attribution of responsibility clearly works in a manner different from that in established democracies. Although focused on the case of Korea, the results of this study have important implications for economic voting in any new democracy.

A different choice, a different outcome: budgetary effects of a conservative legislator in liberal local regions of South Korea

“…Even Lee Jung-hyun winning the election was based on a certain degree of regional attachment, not complete economic voting, considering that Lee's birthplace is Jeolla-do. Several studies in the Korean context still reveal that economic conditions tend to have a secondary influence on voters' decision-making (Pak, 1993; Kang, 2013; Park, 2019; Lee and Repkine, 2020).…”

“…Over a long time period, regionalism has evolved into one of the most salient characteristics of Korean contemporary politics (Stockton and Heo, 2004; Moon, 2005; Horiuchi and Lee, 2008; Kang, 2013; Kang and Bae, 2018; Lee and Repkine, 2020). Before democratization, the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism led to the formation of regimental bloc voting between the Yeongnam and Honam areas.…”

“…Regionalism was adopted as a means of securing the party's approval rating, and influential politicians of the party, who were considered heroes, strengthened the support and solidarity of the local people by linking their backgrounds, such as their hometowns, with the party's identity 8 . Thus, regional politics has been strengthened as party-oriented voting coupled with the expansion of the hero-centered election strategy (Moon, 2009; Kang, 2013; Jang and Eom, 2015).…”

Comprehensive Retrospective Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems: Evidence from the 2016 Korean Legislative Election

“…Lee and Glasure (2012), however, show significant effects of sociotropic economic evaluations on vote choice in the 2002 Korean presidential election, but they find no evidence for egocentric economic voting. In addition, Kwon (2008) and Kang (2012) find that voters’ retrospective sociotropic economic evaluation affected vote choice in the 2007 presidential election. Choi (2007) argues that economic voting was not observed in the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential elections because one-party dominance made it difficult for Koreans to judge the government's economic performance – the opposition parties were unable to demonstrate their ability to govern and therefore Korean voters were not confident that the opposition parties would be able to handle the economy better than the ruling party.…”

Effects of electoral margins on party loyalty in the roll call votes: Evidence from the 20th National Assembly in South Korea

“…The Korean political environment is characterized by uneven regional industrialization, systematically biased elite recruitment by political parties, and voter attachment to particular regional political leaders (Hix and Jun, 2009; Kang, 2013; Lee and Brunn, 1996; Moon, 2005). Under a long-standing authoritarian regime, political parties receive highly concentrated support from their home regions through bloc votes that have persisted over time (Kang and Jaung, 1999).…”