Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Vietnam

Grossman, Derek

doi:10.7249/rr4412.6

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…It called for the application of omnidirectional foreign policy, aimed at the creation of brand‐new amity relations. It resulted in the establishment of relations not only with ASEAN states, but also with Japan, or the United States (Grossman, 2020: 8). The second was Resolution No.…”

Section: Vietnammentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A special category comprised of meetings of high officials of communist parties, that involved not only leaders but also members of central committees. The aim was to identify areas of shared interests (Grossman, 2020: 19; Thayer, 2011: 351). For instance, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited China in 2011, where he met his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao.…”

Section: Vietnammentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here I should mention the Three No's Policy, firstly unveiled in the White Paper on defense in 1998, which comprised of three prohibitions: no formal military alliances, no foreign military bases on Vietnam's soil, and no military activities aimed against any third country. According to Grossman, this policy made “ one of the major obstacles to deepening substantive cooperation—particularly in defense domain ” (2020: 10). Vietnam expressed concerns about China's rising military capabilities and its willingness to use them to press its interests, regularly.…”

Section: Vietnammentioning

confidence: 99%

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More than just hedging? The reactions of Cambodia and Vietnam to the power struggle between the United States and China in times of Obama's “pivot to Asia”

Železný

2022

Asian Politics and Policy

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Southeast Asia is a major theater in the superpower rivalry between China and the United States. The states in this region face the challenge how to react to this intensified strategic competition. Some authors suggest a concept of hedging as the main behavioral response of the region. Nevertheless, critics argue that just one concept cannot incorporate all the variation in their behavior. They often name Cambodia and Vietnam as problematic examples -Cambodia rather bandwagoning with China and Vietnam being more a balancer than a hedger. The goal of this article is to create original operational definition of hedging that would address existing limitations through a comparison of the foreign policy of Cambodia and Vietnam during the US pivot to Asia during the Barrack Obama administration. This article finds that hedging can be useful to analyze the responses of Southeast Asian states despite the perceived contradictory stances of Cambodia and Vietnam.

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Section: Vietnammentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vietnammentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Vietnammentioning

confidence: 99%

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More than just hedging? The reactions of Cambodia and Vietnam to the power struggle between the United States and China in times of Obama's “pivot to Asia”

Železný

2022

Asian Politics and Policy

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“…In order to have a sustainable ally and partner, the US needs to build trust and sufficient military power "integrated deterrence" in the regional security mechanism, including relations with Vietnam. In addition, Washington should adopt a more diversified strategy, including security cooperation, diplomacy, and economics, which will provide hedging and balance for Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, in their relations with China (Grossman, 2020).…”

Section: Vietnam's Responsementioning

confidence: 99%

Vietnam’s Perception and Response to the Emerging Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture

Manh

2022

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With the rising of the two emerging great power - China and India, the "Indo-Pacific" has already possessed the fundamental conditions of the regional security complex, while the United States as the hegemonic state intervenes in security affairs which takes advantage of characteristics of the identity structure and power structure of regional security complexes by penetration mechanism. Buzan's theory has shown us the contour of the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. After applying the regional security complex theory to analyze the security of the region, this article analyzes Vietnam’s perception and response to the emerging Indo-Pacific security architecture. The article points out that the perception of regional security structure expressed through foreign policy adjustment can be basically divided into two layers: regional and extra-regional. In which the regional layer with the focus on ASEAN; and the extra-regional is ASEAN-centered multilateral groups. Since then, Vietnam has tried to incorporate its foreign policy calculations into the multilateral and multi-dimensional Indo-Pacific agenda. Vietnam's response manifests itself mainly in strengthening economic and trade cooperation with China, deepening security cooperation with the US and its network of allies, and with the help of the power of ASEAN to restrain the US and China. In addition, with its favorable geographical position and strong rise in recent years, Vietnam expects India to become an indispensable "security supplier" and an indispensable "balancing force" in Indo-Pacific regional security architecture.

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“…In addition to these, Vietnam has shown interest in informal arrangements and support offered by the US, Japan and India. It is widely believed that ‘since the Soviet Union abandoned its alliance with Vietnam to mend ties with China in 1986, Hanoi has been consistent over decades to avoid repeating the mistake of aligning with one great power against another’ (Grossman, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vietnam’s Regional Security Perceptions and Priorities: Role of India

Mishra¹

2021

India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

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Over the past several decades, India and Vietnam have consolidated their relationship through bilateral engagements, which have been complemented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led multilateral mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, and the India-led Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Building up on their traditionally strong relations, India and Vietnam have widened and deepened their defence and strategic links in recent years, which is manifested in joint trainings, military exercises and defence Lines of Credit offered by India. Since the 1990s, especially over the last decade, both India and Vietnam have made strategic readjustments to elevate their respective bilateral ties with like-minded countries bringing about new commonalities in their politico-strategic visions and policies. Like India, Vietnam too is trying to bring the multilateral and multi-dimensional Indo-Pacific agenda to the mainstream of its foreign policy calculations, facilitated by greater warmth in ties with Japan and the US. Vietnam’s embracing of the Indo-Pacific is also in sync with ASEAN’s Outlook on Indo-Pacific. It also aligns well with Vietnam’s longstanding policy of ‘Three Nos’, expanded to four in its 2019 Defence White Paper. While recent developments in the South China Sea have exacerbated Vietnam’s growing anxieties vis-à-vis China, considering its trade interlinkages and dependence on China (and Russia), it is apparent that Vietnam is not yet ready to uproot its multi-layered linkages with China and get on board the ‘Quad plus’ initiative that is perceived as an overtly anti-China coalition of democracies. India–Vietnam ties, therefore, must rely on the bilateral plank along with ASEAN-linked mechanisms, MGC, and the Indo-Pacific construct, while trying to develop concerted actions through deeper cooperation with Japan and the US. In short, any initiative to include Vietnam in a Quad Plus mechanism without sufficiently developing synergies with individual countries would not yield desired outcomes. This article argues that India–Vietnam ties would benefit most by attaching their bilateral pillar of relationship with the ASEAN- and Indo-Pacific-centred inclusive multilateral mechanisms while gradually engaging the US, Japan and other potential partners in suitable frameworks.

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Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Vietnam

Cited by 9 publications

References 2 publications

More than just hedging? The reactions of Cambodia and Vietnam to the power struggle between the United States and China in times of Obama's “pivot to Asia”

More than just hedging? The reactions of Cambodia and Vietnam to the power struggle between the United States and China in times of Obama's “pivot to Asia”

Vietnam’s Perception and Response to the Emerging Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architecture

Vietnam’s Regional Security Perceptions and Priorities: Role of India

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