Regional Trade and Institutional Design: Long after Hegemony?

Pevehouse, Jon C.; Hafner-Burton, Emilie M.; Zierler, Matthew C.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2702048

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…; Pahre ) and the observed heterogeneity in PTA structure and institutional design (Pevehouse et al. ; Zierler, ). Mansfield et al.…”

Section: Bits and Ptas: The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Borrowing from the democratic peace literature, the literature establishes that democracies fight fewer trade wars with each other and are more cooperative on trade issues generally. Regime type explains the willingness to sign PTAs (Mansfield et al, 2000;Pahre, 2008) and the observed heterogeneity in PTA structure and institutional design (Pevehouse et al, 2002). Mansfield et al (2000), for instance, suggest that domestic ratification by a protectionist legislature results in more significant bilateral liberalization than occurs in states without a domestic ratification requirement.…”

Section: Bits and Ptas: The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Regime type and international commercial agreements

Rosendorff

Shin

2015

Int J of Economic Theory

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Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) limit memberstates' policy discretion; consequently policy uncertainty is mitigated. Reductions in policy uncertainty stemming from accession to an International Agreement (IA) improves the resource allocation decisions of the voters and reduces deadweight losses from the need to self-insure against policy uncertainty. If electoral accountability makes expropriation of assets or discriminatory treatment of firms more costly to leaders (whereas electoral accountability has little effect on rent creation via tariff revenues) then among developing countries, democratic states sign PTAs relatively more frequently than autocratic states; however autocratic states are more likely to sign BITs than are democratic states. We offer a simple model, and present some empirical regularities consistent with the theory.

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“…; Pahre ) and the observed heterogeneity in PTA structure and institutional design (Pevehouse et al. ; Zierler, ). Mansfield et al.…”

Section: Bits and Ptas: The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Bits and Ptas: The Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Regime type and international commercial agreements

Rosendorff

Shin

2015

Int J of Economic Theory

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“…Scholars have borrowed from the democratic peace literature, arguing that democracies fight fewer trade wars with each other and are more cooperative on trade issues generally. Regime type explains the willingness to sign PTAs (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000; Pahre 2008) and the observed heterogeneity in PTA structure and institutional design (Pevehouse, Hafner‐Burton, and Zierler 2002). Explanations for the democratic tendency to sign PTAs have relied on claims about domestic institutional structure.…”

Section: Pta Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession¹

Hollyer

Rosendorff

2012

International Studies Quarterly

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Hollyer, James R. and B. Peter Rosendorff. (2012) Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/j.1468‐2478.2012.00750.x  © 2012 International Studies Association Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit member‐states’ trade policy discretion; consequently, policy uncertainty is mitigated. Reductions in policy uncertainty stemming from accession to a PTA improve the resource allocation decisions of the voters and reduce deadweight losses from the need to self‐insure against policy uncertainty. The resultant increase in efficiency improves an incumbent government's—particularly a democratic government's—chance of surviving in office. We test this prediction using survival analysis, adjusting for potential selection biases using propensity score matching. We find robust support for the proposition that governments that sign PTAs survive longer in office than observationally similar governments that do not sign. In addition, we find that this effect is stronger in democracies than in autocracies.

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“…Compared to regimes tending towards autocracy, democratic regimes are characterized by heterogeneous veto players which weaken the ability of the executive to back on ex-ante commitments. Democracies signal their intention to other states and are able to commit credibly and clearly as opposed to authoritarian states (Fearon 1994, andPevehouse et al 2002). Li and Resnick (2003) have argued that property rights are stronger in democratic regimes, thus providing confidence to investors that they are safe from expropriation of their assets in host countries.…”

Section: Heterogeneous International Institutions Domestic Politics mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of FDI Flows into Developing Countries: Does the Depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?

Rana

Kebewar

2014

SSRN Journal

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There is considerable debate whether the domestic political institutions (specifically, the country's level of democracy) of the host developing country toward foreign investors are effective in establishing the credibility of commitments are still underway, researchers have also analyzed the effect of international institutions such as (GATT-WTO) membership and Bilateral Investment treaties (BIT) in their role of establishing the credibility of commitment to attract foreign investments. In addition, most recent studies have examined the effect of International Trade Agreements (TAs) on FDI flows as they contain separate investment chapters and dispute settlement mechanism, thus providing confidence to investor regarding the security of their investments. We argue that there are qualitative differences among various types of trade agreements and full-fledged trade agreements (FTA-CU) provide credibility to foreign investors and democracy level in the host country conditions this effect whereas the partial scope agreements (PSA) are not sufficient in providing credibility of commitments and not moderated by democracy. This paper analyses the impact of heterogeneous TAs, and their interaction with domestic institutions, on FDI inflows. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2005 support this argument. The method adopted relies on fixed effects estimator which is robust to control endogeneity on a large panel dataset. The strict erogeneity of results by using a method suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and no feedback effect found in sample. The results state that (1) More the FTA-CU concluded, larger the amount of FDI inflows are attracted into the developing countries and PSA are insignificant in determining the FDI inflow; (2) FTA-CU are complementary to democratic regime whereas the conditional effect of PSA with democracy on levels of FDI inflows is insignificant.

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Regional Trade and Institutional Design: Long after Hegemony?

Cited by 7 publications

References 25 publications

Regime type and international commercial agreements

Regime type and international commercial agreements

Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession¹

The Political Economy of FDI Flows into Developing Countries: Does the Depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?

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Regional Trade and Institutional Design: Long after Hegemony?

Cited by 7 publications

References 25 publications

Regime type and international commercial agreements

Regime type and international commercial agreements

Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession1

The Political Economy of FDI Flows into Developing Countries: Does the Depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?

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Leadership Survival, Regime Type, Policy Uncertainty and PTA Accession¹