Regionalism as an Instrument: Assessing Brazil's Relations with its Neighbourhood

Abstract

This article aims to understand the basic characteristics of regionalism in Brazilian foreign policy. For this purpose, it goes over the recent history of Brazilian involvement in regional trade and security arrangements in South America. It also examines the manner in which economic uncertainties, brought about by the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, affected Brazilian foreign policy towards its region. Based on this historical analysis, it defines five key aspects that characterise Brazilian behaviour in the region, namely: post-democratisation regionalism; presidential regionalism; reactive regionalism; concentric/multilevel regionalism; and instrumental regionalism.

The hegemonichermano: South American collective identity and Brazilian regional strategy

“…The perception that one of the partners might come to obtain more advantages in the integration process is harmful to the continuity of the efforts for consolidating Mercosur. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2011, 165) In tune with this utilitarian reading, Lazarou and Theodoro (2015) also argue that Brazil's regionalism is a means to an end, seeking to secure regional stability, recognition on a global level as a regional power, and to balance against US influence.…”

“…This reticence led neighboring countries -where nationalist discourses had become prevalent -to become frustrated and systematically challenge Brazilian leadership, as exemplified by the nationalization of gas in Bolivia (2006) and Ecuador's expulsion of Brazilian companies (2008). Payoffs, direct investment, and funding did eventually become an important part of Brazil's regionalism, enacted through organs such as the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES), the Fund for Strucutral Convergence of Mercosur (Fundo para a Convergência Estrutural do Mercosul, FOCEM), and the Initiative for South American Regional Infrastructure Integration (Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Regional Sul-Americana, IIRSA), though it is not consensual among authors how persuasive Brazil has been as a paymaster (Saraiva 2011;Lazarou and Theodoro 2015). Burges (2015) suggests a linearity between different phases of hegemony: first "consensual hegemony", which is less costly and focused on ideas; followed by "cooperative hegemony", when payoffs become necessary for ensuring support.…”

Brazilian Regional Leadership Revisited: Testing the Long‐Term Determinants of South American Followership (1995–2015)

“…Authors close to officialdom state that South America's individuation as a subsystem is a geographical fact (Danese, 2009: 90). Others, however, highlight political and economic reasons, notably the exclusion of its competitor Mexico (Lazarou and Luciano, 2015). After Mexico's accession to NAFTA, Brazilian authorities denounced a rupture in the Latin American space and, fearful of sprawling US influence, privileged the South American perimeter as a more viable milieu (Lafer, 1997: 259).…”

Diplomats, Quo Vadis? The determinants of Brazilian diplomatic presence

“…Though successive administrations have unvaryingly underscored the primacy of South America, scholarship remains divided. Some authors emphasize that Brazil sees the region merely as a stepping-stone for global ambitions (Spektor 2010;Vigevani and Cepaluni 2011;Lazarou and Theodoro 2015), or that Brasilia stands astride its region and the world (Malamud and Rodriguez 2014), and that its Global South identity at times eclipses its South American one (Mesquita and Medeiros 2016).…”