Regionalist Parties in Central Government: A Shift in Ministerial Portfolio Preferences?

Abstract

This article takes a closer look at the ministerial representation of peripheral elites in central state institutions. We assess the ministerial portfolios that regionalist parties hold once they enter national government. We use a novel dataset that consists of a large sample of ministerial posts (N=1880) allocated to regionalist parties across Western multilevel democracies throughout the post–World War II period. An empirical analysis shows that regionalist parties control a disproportionately high share of the minister posts, a proportionate share of the policy domains, and a disproportionately low share of the key leadership positions in national cabinets. They have a distinctive preference to hold territorial and institutional (that is, decentralization) responsibilities in their ministerial portfolios. In contrast, concerning secondary policy domains (social-economic and culture-identity) they appear to be highly flexible. Ministerial appointments are an important gateway for peripheral elites to get access to central state institutions. It is also one of the clearest manifestations of (policy) payoffs: portfolios are meaningful tools to defend the interests of a territorial subgroup. Yet, there is no straight line from portfolio distribution to policy outcomes at the end of a legislative term. Resolving this broader question of a party’s influence on public policy requires continued research.

Secessionism as the Mainstream: Regionalist Parties’ Strategies in the Catalan and Scottish 2021 Regional Elections

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Pacification through decentralization: An explanatory analysis of ethno‐territorial cabinet conflict in Belgium (1979–2006)

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