Regulating Competition

Abstract

Cartels, trusts and agreements to reduce competition between firms have existed for centuries, but became particularly prevalent towards the end of the nineteenth century. In the mid-twentieth century governments began to use so called 'cartel registers' to monitor and regulate their behaviour. This book provides cases studies from more than a dozen countries to examine the emergence, application and eventual decline of this form of regulation.Beginning with a comparison of the attitudes to regulation that led to monitoring, rather than prohibiting cartels, this book examines the international studies on cartels undertaken by the League of Nations before the Second World War. This is followed by a series of studies on the context of the registers, including the international context of the European Union, and the importance of lobby groups in shaping regulatory outcomes, using Finland as an example. Part II provides a broad international comparison of several countries' registers, with individual studies on Norway, Australia, Japan, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. After examining the impact of registration on business behaviour in the insurance industry, this book concludes with an overview of the lessons to be learned from twentieth-century efforts to regulate competition.With a foreword by Harm G. Schröter, this book outlines the rise and fall of a system that allowed nations to tailor their approach to regulating competition to their individual circumstances while also responding to the pressures of globalisation that emerged after the Second World War. This book is suitable for those who are interested in and study economic history, international economics and business history.

From cartels to futures. The aluminium industry, the London Metal Exchange and European competition policies, 1960s–1980s

“…The registers of cartel agreements have interested recent studies, which agree about the ambiguity of this regulation that swung between survey and buoyancy of authorities in regards of collusion. 89 fears about the negative consequences that public disclosure of the Brandeis agreement, recognising that this case 'could lead to a clash between the executive and the judiciary,' and it also proposed to producers to 'redraw the agreement in such way that it would not be registrable.' 91 After some discussions between the Board of Trade and BACO, the agreement was finally registered in 1968, but asking to keep it confidential.…”

Yrityshistoria ja kasvuyrittäjyys

“…esim. Fellman & Shanahan, 2016;Jensen-Eriksen, 2009;Kallioinen, 2019. ) Harva elinkeinoelämässä rakasti kilpailua, vaikka kansantaloustieteen opit sen virkistävästä vaikutuksesta tunnettiin.…”