Regulating regulators through liability &lt;br&gt; The case for applying normal tort rules to supervisors

Giesen, I.

doi:10.18352/ulr.15

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…In addition, it is unlikely that board members have enough assets to pay for all the damages. Therefore, a more likely candidate to sue (often discussed in legal doctrine, but increasingly also seen in practice) is the financial regulator who failed to act appropriately to prevent the bankruptcy of the financial institution (Tison, 2005;Giesen, 2006). Liability of financial regulators is, however, a controversial topic in Europe.…”

Section: Tort Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions: a law and economic analysis

Dijkstra

Faure²

2011

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

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Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to understand the incentive effects of existing compensation mechanisms in case of the bankruptcy of a financial institution. Design/methodology/approach -The paper uses insights of law and economics to predict the effects of compensation mechanisms on the incentives of depositors, financial institutions, financial regulators and government. Findings -The paper shows that the current compensation system in The Netherlands will not provide sufficient incentives for all stakeholders to prevent the failure of a financial institution. Adjustments to this system are necessary to improve these incentives. Original/value -The paper examines for the first time the impact of different compensation mechanisms on the incentives of multiple stakeholders. It also shows how these mechanisms influence each other regarding their incentive generating capability. These findings offer important insights for policy makers.

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Section: Tort Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions: a law and economic analysis

Dijkstra

Faure²

2011

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance

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“…The crux of this argument is the idea that to exclude supervisory liability is to convey the impression that supervision is to be conducted on a 'best efforts basis', sending the wrong signal to those exercising supervisory powers. 130 Giesen (2006), p. 15, with an emphasis on First Council Directive 77/780/EEC; and Dragomir, pp. 65 -93.…”

Section: Arguments For Supervisory Liabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The author is not aware that, despite the parallel existence, within the EU, of Member States where restrictions on supervisory liability apply alongside others where banking supervisors are subject to the regular liability regime, any comparative study has been conducted in terms of the effectiveness of supervision. 131 On avoiding damage to reputation as a supervisory incentive, see Dijkstra (2010), p. 122;and Giesen (2006), p. 15. 132 See Goodhart, See, e.g., Scarso, p. 115;Giesen (2006), p. 15;and Rossi, (2003) Arguments in favour of supervisory liability could also be drawn from the concept of supervisory accountability 134 .…”

Section: Arguments For Supervisory Liabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial Sector Supervisors' Accountability: A European Perspective

Athanassiou

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…15 . See Giesen (2006) for an argument for treating the liability of supervisors as a regular form of civil law liability (either in tort or contract). 16 .…”

Section: Communication About Product Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Universalizing Complete Access to Finance: Key Conceptual Issues

Rai¹,

Ananth²,

Mor

2010

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Asian Development Bank InstituteThe Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI's working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.Asian Development Bank Institute Kasumigaseki Building 8F 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-6008, JapanTel:+81-3-3593-5500 Fax:+81-3-3593-5571 URL:www.adbi.org E-mail: info@adbi.org AbstractIn this paper, we present two stylized models of the financial system. We make the case that in order to realize the potential of a well-functioning complete financial market, financial system designers and financial service providers will need to think about ways to deliver financial propositions that are customized to individual households by responding to their unique circumstances. This will entail the presence of proximate, well-trained providers that intermediate between the customer and those large "product manufacturers" whose goal is financial well being and not merely product sales. These providers would need to use expertise in financial advice or wealth management to develop integrated financial propositions for clients. We also highlight some of the important debates that arise in making this stylized financial system a reality.

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Regulating regulators through liability <br> The case for applying normal tort rules to supervisors

Cited by 7 publications

References 3 publications

Compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions: a law and economic analysis

Compensating victims of bankrupted financial institutions: a law and economic analysis

Financial Sector Supervisors' Accountability: A European Perspective

Universalizing Complete Access to Finance: Key Conceptual Issues

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