Regulating the Big Data-Based Discriminatory Pricing in Platform Retailing: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Mou, Shandong; Zhong, Ke; Ma, Yanhui

doi:10.3390/math11112579

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Before proceeding, the following assumptions are needed. The assumptions of some parameters are similar to the literature [27,28]. Hypothesis 1.…”

Section: Basic Assumptions and Payoff Matrixmentioning

confidence: 94%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation

Xu,

Liu,

et al. 2024

Mathematics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the frequent occurrence of financial risks, financial innovation supervision has become an important research issue, and excellent regulatory strategies are of great significance to maintain the stability and sustainable development of financial markets. Thus, this paper intends to analyze the financial regulation strategies through evolutionary game theory. In this paper, the delayed replication dynamic equation and the non-delayed replication dynamic equation are established, respectively, under different reward and punishment mechanisms, and their stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies are investigated. The analysis finds that under the static mechanism, the internal equilibrium is unstable, and the delay does not affect the stability of the system, while in the dynamic mechanism, when the delay is less than a critical value, the two sides of the game have an evolutionary stable strategy, otherwise it is unstable, and Hopf bifurcation occurs at threshold. Finally, some numerical simulation examples are provided, and the numerical results show the correctness of the proposed algorithm.

show abstract

“…Before proceeding, the following assumptions are needed. The assumptions of some parameters are similar to the literature [27,28]. Hypothesis 1.…”

Section: Basic Assumptions and Payoff Matrixmentioning

confidence: 94%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation

Xu,

Liu,

et al. 2024

Mathematics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, the super platform's decision depends not only on the costs and benefits of selecting various strategies, but also on the decision probabilities of the startup platform and the government regulator. According to the stability theorem of the differential equation [71][72][73][74], if the super platform reaches a stable state, then: F(p) = 0, F (p) < 0. Proposition 1.…”

Section: Evolutionary Stability Strategy Analysis Of the Super Platformmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Double-Round Monopoly of Super Platforms in China—Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Ma,

Zhang,

Guo

et al. 2023

Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, the regulation of double-round monopoly for super platforms has rapidly become a key instrument of the anti-monopoly practice for Internet platforms in China. This paper aims to explore the evolutionary mechanism of double-round monopoly by using evolutionary game theory and constructing a four-party evolutionary game model that includes a super platform, an incumbent platform, a startup platform, and a government regulator, based on considering the micro-dynamic interactions between subjects and the main influencing factors of the evolutionary mechanism using numerical simulation. This study illustrates that the decisions made by each subject and its probability changes affect the evolution rate of double-round monopoly. Depending on the probability of double-round monopoly in the market, government regulators need to be flexible in switching between strict and less-strict regulation strategies to evolve the system to a more desirable, stable state. As well, we conclude that the regulatory strength of the government regulator, the cross-border magnitude of the super platform, the innovation incentive subsidy of the startup platform, and the synergistic risk cost of the incumbent platform have more significant effects on the evolutionary process of double-round monopoly. Therefore, it is suggested that government regulators should focus on the cross-border magnitude of super platforms to safeguard the rights and interests of incumbent platforms and startup platforms in order to allow for fair competition. At the same time, they should also adjust the regulation intensity by the evolution of double-round monopoly in the market, in order to realize real-time dynamic regulation with the mutual coordination of multiple entities.

show abstract

Regulating the Big Data-Based Discriminatory Pricing in Platform Retailing: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Cited by 2 publications

References 25 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation

Study on the Evolutionary Mechanism of Double-Round Monopoly of Super Platforms in China—Based on Four-Party Evolutionary Game

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About