Regulating Zhibo in China: Exploring multiple levels of self‐regulation and stakeholder dynamics

Abstract

In recent years, user‐generated live streaming platforms have grown significantly in their popularity. However, the circulation of objectionable live streaming content and the unpredictability and high‐intensity user engagement generated by live streaming has posed challenges to the existing regulatory frameworks. In China, the situation of regulating Zhibo (literally ‘live streaming’) is arguably even more complex due to the rapid industrial changes, a mass scale of video content along with the Wanghong Economy, and fragmented internet governance. Drawing on interviews and analysis of regulatory documents, this study investigated the dynamic negotiations among regulatory actors in Chinese live streaming sectors, underscoring that the idea of multiple levels of self‐regulation with minimal state oversight has become the principal strategy for regulating live streaming in a multiactor coordination context. Regulation of the Zhibo is characterized by a conflict between uneven accountability and decentralized regulatory activities in the contemporary regulatory regime.

Regulating tuwei culture and migrant youth through Kuaishou's platform governance

“…Platform companies often obscure and selectively disclose information about their algorithms (Cotter, 2023; Duffy & Meisner, 2023). The government plays the role of a framework designer, and their policies can be contingent (Qiu & Dwyer, 2023). Consequently, ethnographic observation and interviews were conducted to unveil the opaque governance strategies.…”

“…The CAC plays a crucial role in content censorship, protection of minors, management of blacklists, and overall supervision. Notably, the detailed rules pertaining to these responsibilities are primarily developed by platform companies themselves rather than governmental agencies (Qiu & Dwyer, 2023).…”

“…The primary objective of the state is to prompt digital platforms to engage in self‐regulation (Qiu & Dwyer, 2023). Since 2018, Kuaishou has assumed a critical role in the broader political censorship and control efforts of the state.…”

“…Nonetheless, China's state control is not solely top‐down but rather multifaceted in nature (Yang, 2017). The involvement of users in peer regulation contributes to a bottom‐up, co‐governance model of the platform (Qiu & Dwyer, 2023). Numerous teenage mothers strive to become weishang (online micro‐businesspeople) by showcasing their pregnancies to attract attention.…”

Borderline practices on Douyin/TikTok: Content transfer and algorithmic manipulation

“…The crackdown on Viya signalled an industrial turn at the end of 2021, forecasting changes in the livestreaming industry: a moment to regulate and meet the Party line. Apart from tax issues, content moderation is also regulated, via measures like content monitoring and state censorship (Qiu 2021). Copyright infringement, an incubator of content transfer seems to be a minor problem under comparison, generating loopholes not properly regulated by relevant legislation.…”