Regulation and competition: emerging issues from an Indian perspective

Abstract

The book draws together contributions from leading experts across a range of disciplines including economics, law, politics and governance, public management and business management. The authors begin with an extensive overview of the issues of regulation and competition in developing countries, and carefully illustrate the important themes and concepts involved. Using a variety of country and sector case studies, they move on to focus on the problems of applicability and adaptation that are experienced in the process of transferring best practice policy models from developed to developing countries. The book presents a clear agenda for further empirical research and is notable for its rigorous exploration of the links between theory and practice.

The role of institutional and regulatory adjustments on Foreign Direct Investment in the European Union area

“…Extensive empirical literature has accessed how the regulatory environment for doing business affects a wide range of economic indicators such as investment, trade, and finance and ultimately a country's performance in terms of economic growth and development. The empirical evidence of the effectiveness or burden of regulation whilst looking into specific sectors or geographic areas (e.g., Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick, , on electricity production; Gutierrez and Berg, , on Latin American telecommunications; and Wallsten, , on African and Latin American telecommunications) and the capability of implementing an existing regulatory framework or reforms (e.g., Cariño, , for the Philippines; Knight‐John, , for Sri Lanka; and Arun, , for India) supports the presence of a positive influence. Efficient regulation is related to achieving success at minimum economic costs (Jalilian et al, ) and has also a positive impact to the economy and the various macroeconomic indicators, whereas inefficient institutions discourage FDI.…”

FDI, Poverty, and the Politics of Potable Water Access

“…The political rewards they reap from this type of investment, based on for instance, anticipated increases in jobs, economic growth, and political support from influential economic elites who tend to favor FDI (Pandya, 2010), may be formidable. Regulatory bodies in developing countries are particularly susceptible, because they have less capacity to address problems of implementation, accountability, commitment, and efficiency (Arun, 2004;Estache & Wren-Lewis, 2009;Kirkpatrick, 2014). This "regulatory capture," first articulated by Stigler (1971), follows when state agencies favor the interest of the groups they were set up to discipline.…”

“…This "regulatory capture," first articulated by Stigler (1971), follows when state agencies favor the interest of the groups they were set up to discipline. Regulatory bodies in developing countries are particularly susceptible, because they have less capacity to address problems of implementation, accountability, commitment, and efficiency (Arun, 2004;Estache & Wren-Lewis, 2009;Kirkpatrick, 2014). However, broad-based public pressure can discipline regulatory agencies and restrain capture, even in developing economies (Bernauer & Caduff, 2004;Blackman, 2008;Parker, Kirkpatrick, & Figueira-Theodorakopoulou, 2008).…”