2009
DOI: 10.4337/9781848449282
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Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation

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Cited by 19 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…New institutional economics has been applied extensively to the study of electricity sector deregulation (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986;Dubash and Rajan, 2001;Guasch, 2004;Finon, 2006;Ménard and Ghertman, 2009). TCE (Williamson, 1985) especially has made significant contributions to the existing debate on whether electricity is best governed through disintegrated firms engaged in market exchange or through regulated vertically integrated firms (Spiller, 2009).…”
Section: The Transaction Costs Of Electricity Inputmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…New institutional economics has been applied extensively to the study of electricity sector deregulation (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1986;Dubash and Rajan, 2001;Guasch, 2004;Finon, 2006;Ménard and Ghertman, 2009). TCE (Williamson, 1985) especially has made significant contributions to the existing debate on whether electricity is best governed through disintegrated firms engaged in market exchange or through regulated vertically integrated firms (Spiller, 2009).…”
Section: The Transaction Costs Of Electricity Inputmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Transaction costs ‘produce an economic universe that is strikingly different from the one envisioned in neoclassical economic theory’ (Furubotn and Richter, 1997: 445; italics in original). The implications are profound; for example, the transaction costs literature overturns much of the mainstream approach to regulation (Joskow, 2002; Ménard and Ghertman, 2009).…”
Section: The Future Of Niementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, it also refers to the role of political markets and ideology shaping political choices from a top-down role. Policy-makers from the macro-layer try to push their preferences using politics as a tool of trading, mainly because of pressures from parties, other politicians, local authorities, and even the society (Ménard and Ghertman, 2009). Therefore, this aspect is also a function of transaction costs involved in all steps of creation, implementation and operationalization of rules.…”
Section: Institutional Complementaritymentioning
confidence: 99%