Regulation, Governance and Capital Structure in Cooperatives

Abstract

The cooperatives governance structure has always been the research priorities in the field of cooperative economics, but so far the issue is still considered as "gray box" or even as "black box". Most of the recent researches focused on the internal governance structure of cooperatives, or take the governance structure of cooperatives as a generalized property rights. Overall, the existing researches lack of the integrated perspective, especially the targeted analytical framework. Therefore, the authors assume that the particularity of cooperatives, in a certain sense, reflected in its membership identity. On this basis, the paper constructed a theoretical analytical framework of cooperatives governance structure which could effectively explain the positioning of existing cooperative types and its evolution trends.

Effect of Liquidity and Dividend Pay-out on Financial Performance of Deposit Taking SACCOs in Kenya

“…The principles of cooperation, particularly democratic member control and members' economic participation, influence the choice of capital (Andrews, 2015). The difficulty cooperatives have in raising capital, mainly when competing with corporates and other businesses, is seen by many as the principal drawback for cooperatives in the current environment (Novkovic, 2008;Gentzoglanis, 2007;Henry, 2005).…”

“…10 shows the movement of the average dividend payout over the five years. Dividend pay-out was highest in 2016, with 2016 also being the highest year of financial performance for the period under study.…”

Heterogeneity of associates, capital structure and profitability of non-financial cooperatives in Colombia

“…De ocurrir este hecho, disminuirían los recursos financieros necesarios para alcanzar los objetivos organizacionales, y los asociados, al percibir que sus aportes sociales podrían estar en riesgo, optarían por incurrir en deuda y no por realizar aportes de capital voluntarios, ya que la deuda se percibe como un mecanismo de protección de capital individual. Este tipo de dinámicas y comportamientos evidencian que la homogeneidad o heterogeneidad de los asociados determinan la estructura de capital y la eficiencia de la organización (Gentzoglanis, 2007).…”