2017
DOI: 10.1111/rego.12139
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Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Abstract: Well‐known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost‐benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the percei… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 54 publications
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“…Our results are very much in line with Woods's () empirical assessment of the effects of cost–benefits requirements, showing that they have been ineffective mechanisms of political control of regulators by public officials. In the case of Brazilian regulators, however, the administrations tried to interfere not through cost–benefit procedures, but rather through systematic impoundments of agencies' budget, partisan composition of the agencies, and strategic use their vacancies.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 87%
“…Our results are very much in line with Woods's () empirical assessment of the effects of cost–benefits requirements, showing that they have been ineffective mechanisms of political control of regulators by public officials. In the case of Brazilian regulators, however, the administrations tried to interfere not through cost–benefit procedures, but rather through systematic impoundments of agencies' budget, partisan composition of the agencies, and strategic use their vacancies.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 87%
“…7 These acts function as ex ante administrative procedures, which are legal constraints on agency decision making (Potoski and Woods, 2001). The purpose of these procedures is to hardwire agencies’ decision making so that future decisions reflect the preferences of the legislators who enacted the procedure (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987, 1989; Potoski and Woods, 2001; Woods, 2018). Thus administrative procedures such as PPRAs reduce agency discretion and enhance the policy influence of the legislators who enacted the procedure.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regulatory analysis, particularly benefit–cost analysis, has emerged over the course of four decades as “an integral part of government accountability—a non‐partisan tool for understanding the likely effects of regulation” (Dudley 2009). Woods finds that “more extensive regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the amount of perceived influence” of political actors (Woods 2018, p. 310).…”
Section: The Durability Of Oira's Procedures and Principlesmentioning
confidence: 99%