1995
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.1995.tb00517.x
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Regulatory Competition in the Single Market

Abstract: Although regulatory competition has been hailed in some quarters as a superior alternative to Council-driven harmonization, little empirical investigation has been carried out to demonstrate how regulatory competition might work in actual EC practice, and therefore whether its expected benefits will, in fact, materialize. Copyright 1995 BPL.

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Cited by 148 publications
(32 citation statements)
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“…However, from an economic perspective public law has always been viewed with suspicion, due to its dangerous potential 3 See, e.g., Eucken (1952), Cooter and Ulen (2004), and Furubotn and Richter (1997). 4 For the economic theory of federalism see Breton (1996), Inman andRubinfeld (1997), andOates (1999); for theories of interjurisdictional competition see Tiebout (1956), Kenyon andKincaid (1991), andFeld (2000); for theories of systems competition and regulatory competition see, e.g., Vanberg and Kerber (1994), Bratton and McCahery (1997), Sun and Pelkmans (1995), Esty and Gerardin (2001a); for an economic approach to legal federalism see Easterbrook (1994), Van den Bergh (1996), Kerber and Heine (2002), and Grundmann and Kerber (2002).…”
Section: Private Law and Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, from an economic perspective public law has always been viewed with suspicion, due to its dangerous potential 3 See, e.g., Eucken (1952), Cooter and Ulen (2004), and Furubotn and Richter (1997). 4 For the economic theory of federalism see Breton (1996), Inman andRubinfeld (1997), andOates (1999); for theories of interjurisdictional competition see Tiebout (1956), Kenyon andKincaid (1991), andFeld (2000); for theories of systems competition and regulatory competition see, e.g., Vanberg and Kerber (1994), Bratton and McCahery (1997), Sun and Pelkmans (1995), Esty and Gerardin (2001a); for an economic approach to legal federalism see Easterbrook (1994), Van den Bergh (1996), Kerber and Heine (2002), and Grundmann and Kerber (2002).…”
Section: Private Law and Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this case, regulatory competition occurs when consumers choose between the products of different countries. The fear of a race to 20 For this broad discussion on regulatory competition, see Oates and Schwab (1988), Revesz (1992), Vanberg and Kerber (1994), Woolcock (1994), Sun and Pelkmans (1995), Bratton et al (1996), Sinn (1997), Vogel (1997), Van den Bergh (1998, 2002, Garcimartin (1999), Ogus (1999), Trachtman (2000), Esty and Geradin (2001a), Heine and Kerber (2002), Josselin (2002, 2003), Kieninger (2002), Ott and Schäfer (2002), Kerber and Budzinski (2003), and Kerber and Grundmann (2006). 21 For yardstick competition in the economic theory of federalism see Salmon (1987), Besley and Case (1995), Wrede (2001), and Bodenstein and Ursprung (2005).…”
Section: Regulatory Competition As Yardstick Competitionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) argue, in these cases the 'goodness of fit' explanation does not perform well. The key mechanism triggered by 'negative integration' via mutual recognition is regulatory competition (Majone 1996;Sun and Pelkmans 1995). Knill and Lehmkuhl exemplify: 'The abolition of trade barriers for beer, for instance, has no direct impact on how the production of beer is regulated at the national level.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Different national regulations might also lead to negative welfare effects due to non-tariff barriers to trade or distortion of competition (leading to problems for the Internal Market in the EU). However, if either preferences and policy objectives connected to a regulatory problem or the extent of market failure problems differ between member states, then decentralised regulatory powers might allow for more 4 See for the relevant economic criteria and the analysis of regulatory competition, e.g., Sun/Pelkmans (1995), Garcimartín (1999), Van den Bergh (2000), Heine/Kerber (2002), Pelkmans (2006, 36-52), Van den Bergh/Camesasca (2006, 406-417), Kerber (2008), and the contributions in Esty/Geradin (2001) and Marciano/Josselin (2002. For the links to the subsidiarity principle see Kirchner (1997) and Backhaus (1998).…”
Section: Vertical Allocation Of Regulatory Powers: the Role Of Regulamentioning
confidence: 99%