Regulatory Environmental Federalism

Dijkstra, Bouwe R.; Fredriksson, Per G.

doi:10.1146/annurev-resource-040709-135112

Cited by 53 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…In addition, when resources are mobile, concerns have been raised that local jurisdictions might want to compete for those resources by setting lax local environmental regulations, thereby resulting in a "race to the bottom" in terms of environmental quality. A large literature exists on this type of interjurisdictional competition for resources (Oates 2002;Dijkstra and Fredriksson 2010), focusing primarily on stationary pollutants generated by production processes (rather than pollutants that cross boundaries or stem from consumption or use of a product, such as an automobile). Both the theoretical and empirical results on this are mixed.…”

Section: Economic Spillovers: Leakage and Interjurisdictional Competimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, the early theoretical literature (Oates and Schwab 1988), which assumed perfectly competitive jurisdictions and no pollution spillovers, found that Tiebout-like competition would lead local jurisdictions to make efficient decisions about local environmental policies as they sought to balance the local benefits and costs of more stringent standards. However, relaxing these assumptions by, for example, allowing strategic interaction among jurisdictions can lead to standards that are too stringent or too lenient, depending on the policy instrument used by the local government, the timing of the moves by regulators and firms, and the ownership of the mobile resource (Dijkstra and Fredriksson 2010).…”

Section: Economic Spillovers: Leakage and Interjurisdictional Competimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Local Environmental Policy in a Federal System: An Overview

Segerson

2020

Agric. Resour. Econom. Rev.

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A number of issues arise when considering the positive and normative implications of local environmental policy making. This paper provides an overview of some of the issues and implications. These vary depending on whether local jurisdictions are charged with determining the stringency of policies or instead stringency is determined at a higher level of government and the local role focuses on implementation and the design of cost-effective measures for achieving the required goals. Key issues include both physical and economic spillovers across jurisdictions, and the extent to which stringency can be differentiated based on local conditions or preferences.

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Section: Economic Spillovers: Leakage and Interjurisdictional Competimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Economic Spillovers: Leakage and Interjurisdictional Competimentioning

confidence: 99%

Local Environmental Policy in a Federal System: An Overview

Segerson

2020

Agric. Resour. Econom. Rev.

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“…Oates and Schwab confirmed that it is possible for a decentralized environmental authority to be efficient, even with interjurisdictional competition for capital [35]. However, decentralization and the Tiebout model require numerous assumptions or conditions [39,40]:…”

Section: Decentralization Of Environmental Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Centralization or Decentralization of Environmental Governance—Evidence from China

Luo

Li³

et al. 2019

Sustainability

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From the perspective of environmental federalism, we extracted the environmental intention words from the work reports of China’s central and provincial governments through data mining, and used the instrumental variable method to conduct empirical experiments concerning the dispute between centralization and decentralization of environmental governance in the Chinese context. The results suggest that a negative correlation exists between the intention of the central government’s environmental governance and the provincial environmental quality, whereas a positive correlation exists between the intention of the provincial government and the provincial environmental quality. Our interpretation is that environmental centralization, coupled with its political, economic, and cultural factors, has converted provincial governments into supporters of environmental pollution, and that the central government’s ongoing environmental protection inspection campaign has forced the provincial government to be somewhat effective. We propose establishing Chinese-style cooperative federalism in environmental authority and not only centralizing or decentralizing in one direction. New transition mechanisms for the central government’s authority should be implemented, such as the environmental protection inspection groups mechanism and the ecological gross domestic product based political tournament.

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“…Innym, bardzo praktycznym rozwi zaniem w zakresie federalizmu rodowiskowego jest koncepcja federalizmu progresywnego. Oznacza ona okre lenie norm i wymogów minimalnych na poziomie centralnym z mo liwo ci zaostrzenia ich na szczeblu regionalnym (Dijkstra, Fredriksson, 2010).…”

Section: Federalizm Fiskalny I Rodowiskowyunclassified

Federalizm fiskalny i środowiskowy a polityka rolna

Wieliczko

2019

PRS

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The creation of an effective and efficient agricultural policy by the state is an extremely difficult task. It seems that designing proper agricultural policy becomes more difficult the larger the area. The aim of the article is to try to answer the question of what role in the creation and implementation of agricultural policy in the EU should be played by the European Commission, and by individual Member States. The answer to this question is based on the theories of fiscal and environmental federalism. The article is based on a review of literature and analysis of the optimal scope of public administration's competences in the creation and implementation of agricultural policy. The obtained results allow to determine how to optimize the division of tasks related to the agricultural policy between the levels of administration, which enables the implementation of a more effective and more efficient agricultural policy.

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Regulatory Environmental Federalism

Cited by 53 publications

References 76 publications

Local Environmental Policy in a Federal System: An Overview

Local Environmental Policy in a Federal System: An Overview

Centralization or Decentralization of Environmental Governance—Evidence from China

Federalizm fiskalny i środowiskowy a polityka rolna

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