Regulatory regimes and efficiency in US local telephony

Resende, Marcelo

doi:10.1093/oep/52.3.447

Cited by 47 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…5 The classical reference here is Cabral and Riordan (1989); for further references, also with less clear-cut results, see Armstrong and Sappington (2005). 6 Investigating the US telecommunication industry, Shin and Ying (1993) and Resende (1999) find no effect of the regulatory regime on productivity (or efficiency) whereas incentive (price cap) regulation is found to have a positive effect by Tardiff and Taylor (1993), Majumdar (1997), and Resende (2000). Different may be motivated by the difficulty in sorting out the effects of regulation from the effects of other contingent and institutional factors, a problem which seems to arise in our case as well.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry

2008

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Making use of an original dataset containing information on 20 Italian motorways concessionaires over the 1992–2004 period, we study the technology prevailing in the motorways industry in Italy. We focus on the estimation of the technical progress for the years covered by our sample, and on the measurement of the economies of scale and density. We find that the industry has experienced significant technical progress and that there are sizeable economies of density and scale (at least up to a medium-large network size). These results provide valuable insights for regulatory purposes, notably for the definition of the optimal dimension of the network of a concessionaire and the correct setting of the X factor in the price cap formula, which is used to regulate the toll levels. We also control for the effects on the performance of the concessionaires due to the changes in the ownership structure and the regulatory regime, both introduced by the recent reform of the industry. We find that the productivity of the concessionaires has not increased with the adoption of a price cap regime, while it has benefited from the privatization process

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry

2008

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“…Several authors have used this methodology to study productive efficiency in other regulated sectors -for instance Resende (2000) in telecommunications and Affuso et al (2002) and Kennedy and Smith (2004) in railways.…”

Section: Methodology and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The reason for the use of the Tobit regression technique is that efficiency scores are bounded between zero and one and a sub-set of the sample may be accumulated into the 1 value (the efficient units). In this case, Tobit regressions offer the best methodology (see Resende, 2000;Pollitt, 1996;Dusansky and Wilson, 1994).…”

Section: Methodology and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Productive Efficiency and Regulatory Reform: The Case of Vehicle Inspection Services

2006

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ABSTRACT:Measuring productive efficiency provides information on the likely effects of regulatory reform. We present a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of a sample of 38 vehicle inspection units under a concession regime, between the years 2000 and 2004. The differences in efficiency scores show the potential technical efficiency benefit of introducing some form of incentive regulation or of progressing towards liberalization. We also compute scale efficiency scores, showing that only units in territories with very low population density operate at a sub-optimal scale. Our results suggest that the introduction of new units in the most densely populated territories (a likely effect of some form of liberalization) would not be detrimental in terms of scale efficiency. We also find economies of scale or scope at the firm level. Finally, we show that between 2002 and 2004, a period of high regulatory uncertainty in the sample's region, technical change was almost zero. Regulatory reform should take due account of scale and diversification effects, while at the same time avoiding regulatory uncertainty.Keywords: Productive efficiency, regulatory reform, vehicle inspections. JEL codes: C61, L51, R38. RESUMEN:El cálculo de la eficiencia productiva proporciona información sobre los efectos potenciales de la reforma regulatoria. Presentamos un ejercicio a partir del análisis de la envolvente de datos (DEA) de una muestra de 38 unidades de inspección de vehículos bajo un régimen de concesión entre los años 2000 y 2004. Las diferencias en los índices de eficiencia muestran la ganancia potencial de la eficiencia técnica al introducir alguna forma de regulación por incentivos o de avanzar hacia la liberalización. También calculamos los índices de eficiencia de escala, mostrando que solo aquellas unidades en los territorios menos densamente poblados operan con tamaños sub-óptimos. Los resultados sugieren que la introducción de nuevas unidades en los territorios más densamente poblados (un efecto esperado de la liberalización) no tendría efectos negativos en términos de la eficiencia de escala. Encontramos, también, economías de escala y gama a nivel de empresa. Finalmente, mostramos que entre 2002 y 2004, un periodo de elevada incertidumbre en la región de la muestra, el cambio técnico fue prácticamente nulo. La reforma regulatoria debe tomar en cuenta los efectos diversificación y escala, al tiempo que evita la incertidumbre regulatoria.

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“…One final study examining the effects of incentive regulation on productivity is that by Resende (2000). This study is very similar to that of Majumdar, using three inputs and three outputs for the period 1988-1993 and focusing just on the impact of incentive regulation on local telephony productivity.…”

Section: Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%