Regulatory strings that bind and the UK Parliament after Brexit

Abstract

This article analyses Brexit’s promise of restoring UK sovereignty and retrieving regulatory autonomy from the EU from the perspective of the UK Parliament. It argues that while the prospects of post-Brexit regulatory alignment remain high, they are to some extent counterbalanced by those of targeted divergence. A twofold argument is put forward to demonstrate this. The first argument builds on the literature on the Brussels effect and argues that the strength of economic interdependence between the UK and the EU and the size and influence of the latter’s market generate significant pressures for UK regulatory alignment with EU standards. This is demonstrated through a qualitative empirical examination of the contents of UK parliamentary scrutiny of the projected impact of Brexit on the key UK export industry sectors: automotive, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and financial services. It is shown that select committees in both Houses of Parliament, including the Eurosceptic ones, have consistently advocated close alignment with EU regulatory standards across the export-intensive economic sectors. As such, these findings relativise the prospects of taking back control to the extent that the substance of Westminster’s post-Brexit legislative activity may continue to be significantly influenced by EU regulation and policy. This is reinforced by the sanctioning mechanism foreseen in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the economic benefits of adhering to the EU’s adequacy and equivalence regimes. These factors therefore facilitate the future Europeanisation of UK law after Brexit. The second argument nuances the first argument by showing that UK legislative and regulatory divergence is not an abstract possibility, but rather a political reality grounded in strong government majority following the 2019 election, the scrutiny approaches that favour assessment of regulatory impacts, and the UK’s willingness to take unilateral action.

Østerrikes EU-medlemskap: institusjonelle og politiske implikasjoner

“…Det samme kan sies om den sveitsiske modellen med sine ulike bilaterale avtaler med EU, i tillegg til en politikk med «autonom tilpasning» (Oesch & Brugger, 2023). Tilsvarende, gitt sin gjensidige avhengighet med EU, følger Storbritannia selv etter brexit mange av EUs regulatoriske standarder (Jancic, 2022). Tatt i betraktning medlemslandenes handlingsrom må vi også erkjenne at medlemslandene ofte har en formell, eller i det minste en de facto, vetorett på mange politikkområder, spesielt på statsmaktens kjerneområder, slik som den felles utenriks-og sikkerhetspolitikken.…”

Solvency II post-Brexit: equivalence discussion in light of the UK solvency II review and the financial services and markets bill

“…However, during the transition period, no comprehensive equivalence decisions have been taken. Even if for one financial services area, Central Counterparty Clearing Houses, (Van Kerckhoven and Odermatt, 2021) temporary equivalence has been granted and now also extended (European Commission, 2022), there are many other areas where either no equivalence regulations are available (Djankov, 2017; Mullineux, 2019; Shalchi, 2020; Asimakopoulos and Wright, 2020; Jancic, 2022; Petit and Beck, 2023) or no decision has been taken yet. As to the House of Lords European Affairs Committee (2022), there is still a lack of EU equivalence decisions because of various reasons.…”