Regulierung der Eisenbahninfrastruktur

Knieps, Günter; Weiß, Hans-Jörg

doi:10.1007/978-3-8349-8266-7_6

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…24 Entsprechend muss aber auch der rechtliche Rahmen, in dem der Regulierer diskretionär agieren kann, eine solche Selbstbindung des Regulierers ermöglichen. 25 Von …”

Section: Analysen Und Berichte Netzregulierungunclassified

Power Grid Investments and Incentive Regulation: Problem Areas and Solutions

Korte

Gawel

2015

Wirtschaftsdienst

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“…24 Entsprechend muss aber auch der rechtliche Rahmen, in dem der Regulierer diskretionär agieren kann, eine solche Selbstbindung des Regulierers ermöglichen. 25 Von …”

Section: Analysen Und Berichte Netzregulierungunclassified

Power Grid Investments and Incentive Regulation: Problem Areas and Solutions

Korte

Gawel

2015

Wirtschaftsdienst

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“…The regulatory interventions should be reviewed regularly. In this context Knieps (2007) explains two categories of possible regulatory failures: a "false positive" occurs if regulators intervene in the market while competition is functioning and there is no need for intervention; a "false negative" occurs if regulatory authorities do not intervene, when the need for regulatory intervention exists from a competition-policy point of view.…”

Section: Framework Of Regulatory Governance Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Today's regulatory institutions always affect future regulation. Knieps (2007) argues that by the time the characteristics of the current market disappear partially (or entirely)e.g., as a result of technological progresscurrent regulatory intervention may be obsolete. Armstrong and Sappington (2006) state in this context: "Consequently, although liberalization should ultimately lead to reduced regulatory oversight and control, more pronounced regulatory and antitrust oversight may be required on an interim basis to ensure that regulatory policy is tailored appropriately to the evolving level of competition and that competition is protected" (p. 360).…”

Section: Framework Of Regulatory Governance Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition and the social cost of regulation in the postal sector

Maegli¹,

Jaag²

2013

Reforming the Postal Sector in the Face of Electronic Competition

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“…The actual quantity, however, is X 7 , causing allocative 1 Congestion models have been developped mostly with applications to road traffic. See for discussions on congestion models Gomez-Ibanez/Small, 1994; Kruse/Berger, 1995;Santos, 2004;Button, 2004;Knieps, 2007. inefficiency with a welfare loss equal to the triangle E C X 7 C 7 . Congestion models suggest that this problem can be solved by implementing a usage price P C , which is derived by the optimum quantity X C and the relevant demand function DQ C .…”

Section: Figure 2 1: Partial Rivalry and Overload Inefficiency In Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Priority and Internet Quality

Kruse¹

2010

Promoting New Telecom Infrastructures

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The significant increase of internet traffic is to a large extent caused by more high-data-rate applications like file-sharing etc. Although network operators constantly increase router and line capacities, overload occurs from time to time, causing delays, jitter and packet-losses at the data packet level. At the service level this may significantly reduce the quality of certain applications. Among those are interactive services like VoIP, some business applications, online gaming etc. and other on-time-services like internet-television. Terms of use: Documents inThis will result in systematic inefficiencies which can mainly be attributed to two reasons. The first one is the widespread use of internet-flatrates and the second one is a much too strict interpretation of the network neutrality principle. The latter describes the fact that every single data packet will be handled strictly equal at every router, no matter what application it belongs to and what the technical and economic consequences of delayed or dropped packets will be.A congestion model shows that flatrates which users' marginal outlays cause to be zero are inefficient as soon as positive marginal overload externalities exist. It comes up with a general pricing solution which will be questioned later on. In this framework, optimal internet capacity is identified and the networks' overprovisioning policy is found to be inefficient.The key issue for internet congestion problem is the fact that, although services are homogenous at the data packet level, they are very heterogenous at the service level. They are very different with respect to data rate, quality-sensitivity, and economic value. Under strict network neutrality rule it can be demonstrated that certain valuable, quality-sensitive services will be significantly harmed (and potentially be crowded out altogether) by non-qualitysensitive, high-data-rate services which may have low economic value.Giving priority to certain services in overload situations looks like the adequate solution to the problem. However, this always bears the risk of discriminating some service providers and applications and will be heavily debated. A more appropriate solution is provided by priority pricing, whereby users express their willingness to pay for priority treatment in case of an overload. Customers have an ex ante choice between different qualities of service. The choice of a service provider to pay for high priority (high quality of service) will de...

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Regulierung der Eisenbahninfrastruktur

Cited by 4 publications

References 9 publications

Power Grid Investments and Incentive Regulation: Problem Areas and Solutions

Power Grid Investments and Incentive Regulation: Problem Areas and Solutions

Competition and the social cost of regulation in the postal sector

Priority and Internet Quality

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