Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction

McKitrick, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00281

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…This approach is endorsed by, at least, Lehrer (1978), McKitrick (2002), Nichols (2007), Buras (2009). As McKitrick says, we “do not originally perceive secondary qualities, except as unknown causes of sensations.…”

Section: Two Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem, recall, is this: if our conception of secondary qualities is an inference from our sensations to some unknown outer cause, and if perceptual intentionality must be noninferential and referentially non-derivative, then we cannot perceive secondary qualities. McKitrick simply says that such perception is “mediated” by our awareness of sensations (McKitrick, 2002, p. 494; see also Nichols, 2007, p. 169)—but of course, by Reid's measure of what constitutes perception, such “perception” is not really perception. It is just an inference based on awareness of a mental entity, e.g., an olfactory sensation.…”

Section: Two Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By far the more popular solution in the secondary literature is to interpret Reid as saying that secondary qualities are perceived only via acquired perception. This approach is endorsed by, at least, Lehrer ( 1978 ), McKitrick ( 2002 ), Nichols ( 2007 ), Buras ( 2009 ). As McKitrick says, we “do not originally perceive secondary qualities, except as unknown causes of sensations.…”

Section: Two Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reid on olfaction and secondary qualities

Quilty‐Dunn

2013

Front. Psychol.

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Thomas Reid is one of the primary early expositors of the “dual-component” theory of perception, according to which conscious perception constitutively involves a non-intentional sensation accompanied by a noninferential perceptual belief. In this paper, I will explore Reid's account of olfactory perception, and of odor as a secondary quality. Reid is often taken to endorse a broadly Lockean picture of secondary qualities, according to which they are simply dispositions to cause sensations. This picture creates problems, however, for Reid's account of how we perceive secondary qualities, including odors. Given Reid's insistence that we come to be aware of odors only by inferring a causal relation to obtain between them and our olfactory sensations, it seems that he cannot allow for direct, noninferential perceptual awareness of odors. Since his general account of perception invokes noninferential perceptual beliefs to explain perceptual awareness, it seems that Reid must either reject this general account for the case of olfactory perception (and supplant it with something else), or else deny that we ever actually perceive odors. I will attempt to reconcile these ideas by appeal to Reid's doctrine of “acquired perception,” which involves the incorporation of learned conceptual representations into perceptual states via perceptual learning. Reidian acquired perception enables genuine olfactory perceptual acquaintance with odors despite the dependence of the semantic properties of the relevant representations on causal relations to sensations. In exploring these issues, I hope to illuminate several features of Reid's account of perception and demonstrate its interest to contemporary theorizing about conscious perception—especially olfaction—in the process. Reid's theory of olfaction remains a live, coherent option for present-day theorists.

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Section: Two Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Two Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Two Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reid on olfaction and secondary qualities

Quilty‐Dunn

2013

Front. Psychol.

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“…On Berkeley's, see Wilson 1987; Faaborg 1999; Atherton 2003. The views of Malebranche (Schmaltz, 1995) and Reid (Ganson, 2002; McKitrick, 2002) have also garnered some attention.…”

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Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color

Puryear

2011

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities.

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“… 5 Whether the colours are dispositions, their causal base, or both, see McKitrick 2002, and Nichols 2003 for the variety of interpretations of Reid's view of secondary qualities. …”

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confidence: 99%

Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?

Benbaji¹

2009

European J of Philosophy

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The controversy over the interpretative issue-is Thomas Reid a perceptual direct realist?-has recently had channelled into it a host of imaginative ideas about what direct perception truly means. Paradoxically enough, it is the apparent contradiction at the heart of his view of perception which keeps teasing us to review our concepts: time and again, Reid stresses that the very idea of any mental intermediaries implies scepticism, yet, nevertheless insists that sensations are signs of objects. But if sensory signs are not mental intermediaries, what are they? Hasn't Reid merely swapped the common 'sensation' for the notorious 'idea', ending up with indirect realism? 1 Current imaginative strategies answer negatively: Reid's sensory sign does not contradict direct perception, and those who think otherwise merely fail to understand what it means.The first aim of this paper is to argue against compatabilist strategies that seek to redefine direct perception so that it suits Reid's theory of signs. I show that no matter how the idea of sensory signs is 'improved', as long as they play a cognitive role in perception, colour and hardness cannot be directly presented to us, and they are turned into theoretical properties.Why then does Reid include sensations at all in the process of perception? Is he an indirect realist? My second aim is to show that the reason for bringing them into his account of perception in the first place is his-to my mind erroneousmetaphysics of colour. Reid claims that colours (like all secondary qualities) are unknown physical qualities, and as such, cannot be perceived. By contrast, primary qualities are perceptible, and hence, in visual experience of them, Reid argues, there are no sensations. Thus, he restricts direct perception to primary qualities presented in vision. Given Reid's belief that a physicalist account of colours renders them imperceptible, a unified account of perception is not, for him, a viable option.But is not Reid's hybrid theory, 2 then, the worst of all worlds? With regard to colours, he is a clear representationalist; with regard to the visual primary qualities, he disavows any sensations, so that we are left with his definition of perception, which makes perception just an immediate belief, and thus loses the intuitive distinction between these two states. 3 Either way, the intuition that perception presents mind-independent objects is lost; secondary qualities are represented in experience, and primary qualities are believed to exist in our vicinity.

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Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction

Cited by 18 publications

References 10 publications

Reid on olfaction and secondary qualities

Reid on olfaction and secondary qualities

Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color

Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?

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