Reinforcement-based adaptive learning in asymmetric two-person bargaining with incomplete information

Enhancing Honesty in Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of the Bonus Procedure

“…Whereas the double-auction game is known to have multiple equilibria (Leininger et al, 1989), the LES is known to maximize the players' expected profit from trade when the distributions F and G are uniform and share the same support (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). Additionally, experimental evidence from several bargaining experiments with either common support (Radner and Schotter, 1989;Valley et al, 2002) or only overlapping and unequal supports Rapoport et al, 1998;Seale et al, 2001;Parco et al, 2004), has supported the LES.…”

“…These two seminal papers were the first to explore the nature of equilibria in the double-auction and establish properties that all equilibria must satisfy. They have had a strong impact on the study of two-person bargaining under incomplete information, have given rise to considerable theoretical research (e.g., Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckre, 2002;Leininger, et al, 1989;Williams, 1989, 1993;Brams and Kilgour, 1996), and stimulated experimental research (e.g., Radner and Schotter, 1989;Rapoport and Fuller, 1995;Daniel et al, 1998;Rapoport et al, 1998;Seale et al, 2001;Parco et al, 2004). Two major reasons for studying this mechanism have been forwarded (Satterthwaite and Williams, 1989).…”

Comparison of basic assumptions embedded in learning models for experience-based decision making

“…For example, it has been argued that model evaluation based on the examination of group averages can lead to different results than the examination of individuals' choices. Likewise, an evaluation based on the prediction of the next choice ahead may lead to different results than another evaluation based on the prediction of many choices ahead (see Rapoport, Daniel, & Seale, 1998;Stahl, 1996).…”

Generality, repetition, and the role of descriptive learning models

“…Yet, another stream of the literature concludes that the assumption of general parameters over games (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1999) is counter-productive. Moreover, studies such as Stahl (1996), Cheung and Friedman (1997), Kitzis, Kelley, Berg, Massaro, and Friedman (1998), Daniel, Seale, and Rapoport (1998), Rapoport, Daniel and Seale (1998), Camerer and Ho (1998), and Busemeyer and Stout (2002) show that individuals are sufficiently different that pooling them together could result in a possible misspecification.…”