Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence

Has Globalisation Affected Collective Bargaining? An Empirical Test, 1980–2009

“…Lower unionisation rates may be one of the transmission channels through which globalisation leads to higher economic inequality. In particular, recent evidence shows that union strength is decisive for bargaining outcomes (Colombo et al., ). We suggest a number of policy implications if increasing levels of inequality are deemed undesirable.…”

A crise do tripartismo europeu: o caso da igualdade de gênero na concertação social em Portugal

“…Para os governos, são claros os múltiplos ganhos com o tripartismo. Como diz Hassel (2009), o que é determinante no tripartismo é o interesse do governo pelo que a situação política e macroeconômica é importante para compreender o desempenho do tripartismo (Hamman et al, 2015;Colombo, Tirelli & Visser, 2014). Através do tripartismo, os governos mobilizam os principais implicados nas políticas, coletam informação e obtêm a sua cooperação na implementação de medidas difíceis (Baccaro, 2015), cumprem com os requisitos democráticos de transparência e prestação de contas (Donaghey & Teague, 2005), conseguindo desse modo apoio eleitoral (Hassel, 2009).…”

“…Através do tripartismo, os governos mobilizam os principais implicados nas políticas, coletam informação e obtêm a sua cooperação na implementação de medidas difíceis (Baccaro, 2015), cumprem com os requisitos democráticos de transparência e prestação de contas (Donaghey & Teague, 2005), conseguindo desse modo apoio eleitoral (Hassel, 2009). O tripartismo, consumado através dos pactos sociais, é uma forma de os governos fomentarem a paz social e atenuarem a conflitualidade social e política (Hamman et al, 2015;Colombo, Tirelli & Visser, 2014). O tripartismo consubstanciou-se como estratégia para ultrapassar bloqueios com os parceiros sociais e foi utilizado em países como Portugal e Espanha, onde reformas trabalhistas encontraram forte resistência (Royo, 2010).…”

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

“…While this scholarship has considered whether governments are likelier to propose and/or complete a social pact when confronting an economic problem load, such as elevated levels of unemployment, high inflation, large budget deficits and/or excessive government debt (Hassel ; Avdagic , ), the requirements of the European Monetary Union Convergence Criteria (Ahlquist ) and union movements with particular organisational characteristics (Baccaro & Lim ; Baccaro & Simoni ; Hassel ; Avdagic , ; Traxler & Brandl ; Colombo et al. ), a primary focus has been on politicians’ political calculations . In particular, it has been argued that governments propose social pacts in an effort to build public support for politically unpopular reforms (Baccaro & Lim ), avoid exclusive blame for unpopular reforms (Hamann & Kelly ), placate organised labor (Baccaro & Simoni ) and demonstrate responsible economic stewardship (Ahlquist ).…”

“…Scholars have focused primarily on why governments choose to relinquish their policy-making autonomy and engage in formal policy agreements with labour unions. While this scholarship has considered the importance of macroeconomic challenges (Hassel 2009;Avdagic 2010Avdagic , 2011, the requirements of the European Monetary Union Convergence Criteria (Ahlquist 2010), and the organisational and numerical strength of labour unions (Baccaro & Lim 2007;Baccaro & Simoni 2008;Hassel 2009;Avdagic 2010Avdagic , 2011Traxler & Brandl 2010;Colombo et al 2014), a primary focus has been on politicians' political calculations. Briefly stated, scholars have argued that governments engage in social pact agreements in order to gain greater public support for -or, relatedly, reduce public opposition to -themselves and their policies (Baccaro & Lim 2007;Hamann & Kelly 2007;Baccaro & Simoni 2008;Ahlquist 2010).…”