Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity

Yamagishi, Toshio; Horita, Yutaka; Mifune, Nobuhiro; Hashimoto, Hirofumi; Li, Yang; Shinada, Mizuho; Miura, Arisa; Inukai, Keigo; Takagishi, Haruto; Simunovic, Dora

doi:10.1073/pnas.1212126109

Cited by 194 publications

(203 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…It is possible that strong reciprocity does not explain cooperation in social dilemmas that involve interactions over multiple turns. This is in line with previous research suggesting that strong reciprocity cannot always explain how people manage free-riding behaviors in social dilemmas (Yamagishi et al, 2012). In the case of our game, from an individual player perspective, the more others used, the higher was the likelihood of the fine for the group.…”

Section: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies In Multi-turn Socisupporting

confidence: 76%

When Push Comes to Shove: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies in a Collective-Risk Household Energy Dilemma

2016

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To solve problems such as climate change, every little push counts. Community energy schemes are a popular policy targeted to reduce a country's carbon emissions but the effect they have on energy use depends on whether people can work together as a community. We often find ourselves caught in a dilemma: if others are not doing their bit, why should I? In our experiment, participants (N = 118) were matched in groups of 10 to play in a collective-risk game framed as a community energy purchase scheme. They made only one decision about energy use for their virtual household a day, while a full round of the game lasted 1 week in real time. All decisions were entered via personal phone or a home computer. If in the end of the week the group exceeded a pre-paid threshold of energy use all group members would share a fine. Each day participants received feedback about decisions of their group partners, and in some groups the feedback was manipulated as high (unfair condition) or low (fair condition) use. High average group use created individual risk for participants to be penalized in the end of the week, even if they did not use much themselves. We found that under the risk of having to pay a fine, participants stayed significantly below the fair-share threshold regardless of unfair behavior of others. On the contrary, they significantly decreased their consumption toward the end of the game. Seeing that others are doing their bit -using a fair-share -encouraged people to take advantage of the situation: those who played against fair confederates did not follow the normative behavior but conversely, increased their consumption over the course of the game. These opportunistic strategies were demonstrated by impulsive participants who were also low in punishment sensitivity. We discuss the findings in the light of policy research as well as literature on cooperation and prosocial behavior.

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Section: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies In Multi-turn Socisupporting

confidence: 76%

When Push Comes to Shove: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies in a Collective-Risk Household Energy Dilemma

2016

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“…This tendency to reject low offers could arise for a number of reasons. Although some models have focused on prosocial motives, such as a preference for "fairness" or an aversion to inequity (8,9), other work has found no link between rejections in the ultimatum game and prosocial behavior in other games (10). This suggests that humans' tendency to reject low offers in the ultimatum game may stem from other sources, such as spite (11,12), culture (3,13), and generalized forms of social learning (14,15).…”

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confidence: 76%

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

LeVeck

Hughes

Fowler

et al. 2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and business elites who have an average of 21 y of practical experience conducting international diplomacy or policy strategy, we show that, compared with undergraduates and the general public, elites are actually more likely to reject low offers when playing a standard "ultimatum game" that assesses how players bargain over a fixed resource. Elites with more experience tend to make even higher demands, suggesting that this tendency only increases as policy makers advance to leadership positions. This result contradicts assumptions of rational self-interested behavior that are standard in models of international bargaining, and it suggests that the adoption of global agreements on international trade, climate change, and other important problems will not depend solely on the interests of individual countries, but also on whether these accords are seen as equitable to all member states.self-interest | bargaining | elites | ultimatum game | game theory

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“…For instance, strong reciprocity explanations for the evolution of cooperation emphasize the stabilizing role of punishment [11]. These explanations, particularly for observed fair behaviour in the ultimatum game, have recently received criticism [44,45]. Spite provides new evolutionary possibilities for explaining the evolution of fairness in these strategic settings.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of fairness through spite

Forber

Smead

2014

Proc. R. Soc. B.

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The presence of apparently irrational fair play in the ultimatum game remains a focal point for studies in the evolution of social behaviour. We investigate the role of negative assortment in the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game. Spite—social behaviour that inflicts harm with no direct benefit to the actor—can evolve when it is disproportionally directed at individuals playing different strategies. The introduction of negative assortment alters the dynamics in a way that increases the chance fairness evolves, but at a cost: spite also evolves. Fairness is usually linked to cooperation and prosocial behaviour, but this study shows that it may have evolutionary links to harmful antisocial behaviour.

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Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is no evidence of strong reciprocity

Cited by 194 publications

References 32 publications

When Push Comes to Shove: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies in a Collective-Risk Household Energy Dilemma

When Push Comes to Shove: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies in a Collective-Risk Household Energy Dilemma

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining

The evolution of fairness through spite

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