Relations Among Perceived Environmental Uncertainty, Organization Structure, and Boundary-Spanning Behavior

Leifer, Richard; Huber, George P.

doi:10.2307/2391958

Cited by 195 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Boundary spanning denotes an interface function operating "at the skin of the organization" (Leifer and Huber 1977), mediating between the external environment and the internal organization in an "organizational/environmental exchange" (Leifer and Delbecq 1978). Boundary-spanning roles may deal with both information processing and external representation (Aldrich and Herker 1977).…”

Section: The Boundary-spanning Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business angel post-investment activities: a multi-level review

Fili

Grünberg

2014

J Manag Gov

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In this article, empirical research on post-investment activities of business angels is reviewed and conceptualized as five distinct governance processes: boundary spanning, structuring, leadership, doing, and monitoring. These processes have the potential to reduce the exposure of business angels to relational risk and market risk.The identification of these governance processes also contributes towards understanding the social aspect of business angels' post investment involvement. In particular, it is shown how the recognition of the cognitive/institutional dimension opens up for new questions about post-investment involvement. Finally, it is proposed that venture performance can be enhanced in practice if business angels and venture members develop skills that are connected to the governance processes.

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Section: The Boundary-spanning Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business angel post-investment activities: a multi-level review

Fili

Grünberg

2014

J Manag Gov

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Section: Resource Dependence Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Forming linkages with outside parties is a coping mechanism as these ties provide advice, information, access to resources and legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The degree to which organizations engage in such boundary spanning activity depends on managerial preferences, but generally increases with environmental uncertainty (Leifer & Huber, 1977;Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005) and with a heavier dependence on external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).However, as organizations and their partners exchange resources, the nature of the interaction depends on the relative power of the parties (Emerson, 1962;Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;Thompson, 1967) and their degree of dependence on each other (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Therefore, organizations with external ties face a risk of their partners appropriating their resources (Gulati & Singh, 1998), necessitating controls, in particular in cases of power imbalance.…”

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confidence: 99%

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

Dieleman

Widjaja

2018

Asia Pac J Manag

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We advance the resource dependence literature on appropriation of organizational resources by powerful partners, focusing on political ties. Using a unique emerging market case of a venture with political ties, we advance theory by unpacking how political connections can hurt the organization by increasing the permeability of organizational boundaries. Our extensions highlight the crucial role of control mechanisms for politically connected organizations.Keywords Organizational boundary . Resource dependence . Political ties . PermeabilityOrganizations commonly seek to create linkages with external parties to access key resources and opportunities (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobodina, 2004), especially in emerging economies (Ahlstrom, Young, Nair, & Law, 2003). Yet these linkages also carry some costs and risks (Lin & Si, 2010). Researchers employing resource dependence theory (RDT) in particular have shown that risks are prevalent when there is a power imbalance, as powerful partners may appropriate organizational resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005;Emerson, 1962;Gulati & Singh, 1998;Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Although considerable research has advanced our knowledge of the conditions under which organizations seek partnerships (e.g., Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009;Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008), we know much less about the mechanisms by which powerful partners appropriate resources (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016;Xia, 2011) and, in turn, how weaker organizations can seek to protect themselves (Katila et al., 2008). This is important as smaller firms increasingly enter new markets and must partner with larger (and sometimes) state linked partners creating relationships that need to be carefully managed (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Rubanik, 2011). How companies can protect themselves against appropriation is a relatively recent but important research topic within RDT, especially in the context of powerful political ties, an area where capture by powerful partners is particularly acute. Political ties link the organization to the government with potentially beneficial effects (Hillman, 2005), but they cannot be fully controlled and may create their own problems such the extraction of rents or derailing strategy (Fan, Wong, & Li, 2007;Lin & Si, 2010;Shleifer & Vishny, 1994;Siegel, 2007;Sun, Hu, & Hillman, 2016;Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). A new generation of RDT research suggests this problem is particularly salient in emerging economies, where new ventures often need powerful political ties to acquire resources such as licenses to operate and build legitimacy, but this can yield a power imbalance that may stimulate appropriation of firm resources (Mellahi et al., 2016).A few recent studies address the question how appropriation works. For instance, Sun et al. (2016) detailed how substantial shareholders colluded with political ties to expropriate minority shareholders, but they focus mostly on well-established publicly listed companies. Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) investig...

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“…Most people do not have a voice in decision-makings (reverse coded). The items were selected from scales developed by Duncan (1971) and refined by Leifer and Huber (1977). Items were adapted slightly to remove phrases such as "on the job" and "in my work group" that might contribute to misunderstandings of the audit context being assessed.…”

Section: Ease Of Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ease of Communication with Supervisors and Auditors’ Information Search Behavior

Tseng¹,

Chang²

2016

IJAT

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This study examines whether ease of communication with supervisors has a positive effect on the breadth and depth of information search that takes place in the execution of an audit assignment. 132 auditors with 2-to-5 years of audit experience participate in a questionnaire survey on the information search behavior the last time they performed a typical audit for a for-profit client. The result shows that ease of entering has a positive and significant correlation with both breadth and depth of information search.

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Relations Among Perceived Environmental Uncertainty, Organization Structure, and Boundary-Spanning Behavior

Cited by 195 publications

References 11 publications

Business angel post-investment activities: a multi-level review

Business angel post-investment activities: a multi-level review

How powerful political ties appropriate resources and how weaker organizations protect themselves: A case study from Indonesia

Ease of Communication with Supervisors and Auditors’ Information Search Behavior

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