Relationship Between the Number of Residency Applications and the Yearly Match Rate: Time to Start Thinking About an Application Limit?

Abstract

IntroductionMatching into residency has become increasingly competitive.1-5 As a result, medical student applicants are submitting an increasing number of applications to the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP). These additional applications can have a deleterious effect on the match in 3 ways: (1) they create an added cost for applicants, (2) they result in an additional time commitment for program directors who need to review these applications, and (3) they cause congestion in the application review process; therefore, program directors may overlook preferred applicants as a result. There is no study investigating whether these additional applications are associated with a benefit to match participants.Game theory is the economic study of decision making. The prisoner's dilemma game illustrates the counterintuitive phenomenon of all members of a group being worse off when each member of the group acts in his or her selfinterest (F I G U R E 1). 6,7 Applying the prisoner's dilemma model to the residency match in aggregate, we hypothesize that applicants may be better off if they could agree to submit a finite number of applications rather than trying to out-apply each other. We have previously published on the possibility of a prisoner's dilemma existing in the urology match, suggesting that the urology match could do without such a large number of applications, and that participants would be served by a reasonably set application limit. 8In this study, we investigated whether other medical specialty matching markets and applicants are benefited by a higher number of applications submitted. We also investigated if there is a related improvement in the match rate in years when larger numbers of applications were submitted. AbstractBackground There has been an increase in the number of applications medical students have submitted for the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP). These additional applications are associated with significant costs and may contribute to match inefficiency.

I dream of Gini: Quantifying inequality in otolaryngology residency interviews

“…They calculated that an application cap of 30 programs per applicant would save over $400 thousand in application costs and 19.3 hours per OHNS program . Likewise, Weissbart et al calculated that a cap of 20 programs per applicant would save $4.7 million yearly in application costs aggregately across 13 specialties …”

“…8 Likewise, Weissbart et al calculated that a cap of 20 programs per applicant would save $4.7 million yearly in application costs aggregately across 13 specialties. 20 Recognizing the asymmetric distribution of interviews, some solutions have been proposed. Since the introduction of the program specific application requirement for OHNS, the number of applications per applicant has decreased.…”

Viewpoint From 2 Graduate Medical Education Deans Application Overload in the Residency Match Process

“…Because of interview hoarding by top applicants, some PDs report forgoing interview offers to top applicants who historically have matched elsewhere and instead favor lower-tier candidates. 2 Another unintended consequence of overapplying is the urgency for PDs to offer early interviews. The PDs know that applicants apply to far more programs than they will ultimately visit for an interview.…”

Challenges and Perspectives to the Rise in General Psychiatry Residency Applications

“…The literature offers a number of solutions to address the rising costs of the interview process for applicants and programs, some more provocative than others [3,[5][6][7]. The general reaction to a rise in applications has been to consider increasing the number of interview slots and days.…”