Relative judgement is relatively difficult: Evidence against the role of relative judgement in absolute identification

Abstract

A variety of processes have been put forward to explain absolute identification performance. One difference between current models of absolute identification is the extent to which the task involves accessing stored representations in long-term memory (e.g. exemplars in memory, Kent & Lamberts, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 31, 289-305, 2005) or relative judgement (comparison of the current stimulus to the stimulus on the previous trial, Stewart, Brown & Chater, Psychological Review, 112, 881-911, 2005). In two experiments we explored this by tapping into these processes. In Experiment 1 participants completed an absolute identification task using eight line lengths whereby a single stimulus was presented on each trial for identification. They also completed a matching task aimed at mirroring exemplar comparison in which eight line lengths were presented in a circular array and the task was to report which of these matched a target presented centrally. Experiment 2 was a relative judgement task and was similar to Experiment 1 except that the task was to report the difference (jump-size) between the current stimulus and that on the previous trial. The absolute identification and matching data showed clear similarities (faster and more accurate responding for stimuli near the edges of the range and similar stimulus-response confusions). In contrast, relative judgment performance was poor suggesting relative judgement is not straightforward. Moreover, performance as a function of jump-size differed considerably between the relative judgement and absolute identification tasks. Similarly, in the relative judgement task, predicting correct stimulus identification based on successful relative judgement yielded the reverse pattern of performance observed in the absolute identification task. Overall, the data suggest that relative judgement does not underlie absolute identification and that the task is more likely reliant on an exemplar comparison process.

Decisional carryover effects in interval timing: Evidence of a generalized response bias

“…This could be due to, for example, some shorter probe durations being judged as 'long', and then in the next trial, because the reference duration was relatively close to that probe duration, decisional carryover occurred. Despite this apparent match between the RJM model predictions and our findings, the RJM model has encountered difficulties in accounting for absolute identification and matching of visual stimuli (see Guest, Adelman, & Kent, 2016). Further research, perhaps combining the roles of short-term influences along with longer-term exemplars, is required in this regard.…”

A Study on the Sufficient Conditional and the Necessary Conditional With Chinese and French Participants

“…Table 4 shows that the coherence rate below 50% is found chiefly with uncertain conditional, even though it is above chance in some cases. One explanation is that our task required making relative probability judgments, which are known to be more difficult than absolute probability judgments ( Stewart et al, 2005 ; Guest et al, 2016 ). This could have impaired the coherence rate of our participants in the conditions involving uncertainty.…”

Autocorrelation in category judgement

“…the response-ratio hypothesis, Luce & Green, 1974). Guest et al (2016) compared conventional AI of 8 lengths of line (Expt 1) with a similar AI of the absolute difference between successive lengths (Expt 2). Their two sets of results are not comparable.…”

“…This would appear to involve some absolute assessment of the difference between 54 and 60 dB. In addition, Guest et al (2016) questioned the role of relative judgement on the basis of a comparison between two tasks: one a conventional AI (of line length) and the second a similar AI of the difference between successive lengths of line (see also Guest et al, 2018).…”