2022
DOI: 10.21203/rs.3.rs-1979811/v1
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Relative-Performance Delegation destabilizes Upstream Collusion

Abstract: This paper analyzes upstream firms’ collusive sustainability when downstream firms adopt the relative-performance delegation in an infinitely repeated Cournot or Bertrand game. We find that relative-performance delegation makes managers acting more aggressive and that leads to more difficult for upstream collusion to be sustained comparing with sales-revenue delegation regardless of the competition modes. The driving force behind our result is that downstream relative-performance delegation decreases input pri… Show more

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