Relativism, Moral

Abstract

Two kinds of moral relativism – metaethical and normative – are here distinguished. Metaethical relativism holds that conflicting moral judgments can both be correct. Normative relativism holds that we have moral reason not to impose our moral views on others if their opposing views are as correct as ours. The most radical versions of these views attract the most attention and criticism: as morally dangerous because they allegedly encourage a light regard for morality and the need for patient, critical examination of difficult moral issues; as confused because they conflate the moral value of tolerance with moral neutrality; and as ill‐founded because they take diversity in moral belief as direct evidence for the absence of universally valid moral requirements. On the other side, moral relativists have taken such criticisms to reflect a moral imperialism that does not trouble itself with an attempt to understand before judging the different to be inferior or mistaking dogmatism for well‐founded conviction. In their more moderate forms these relativist views deserve dispassionate consideration on the basis of their power to explain and respond to fundamental moral disagreement.