Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Andow, James

doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794

Cited by 15 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…His claim has been enormously influential, both within academia and beyond (also taking hold in industry, government, and the wider public consciousness). Its impact in philosophy is particularly evident in recent debates about the reliability of moral intuitions -see, for example, Andow (2016;; Demaree-Cotton ( 2014 With the far-reaching implications of the prospect-theoretic account in mind, we will now consider how recent empirical and theoretical research has begun to challenge it.…”

Section: Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Risky-choice framing and rational decision-making

Fisher¹,

Mandel²

2021

Preprint

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This article surveys the latest research on risky-choice framing effects, focusing on the implications for rational decision-making. An influential program of psychological research suggests that people’s judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. We discuss recent theoretical and empirical research that challenges the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. These approaches typically pay close attention to how decision-makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice) and they highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle. We conclude by indicating avenues for future research that could bring us closer to a complete – and potentially rationalizing – explanation of framing effects.

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Section: Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Risky-choice framing and rational decision-making

Fisher¹,

Mandel²

2021

Preprint

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“…The literature on moral judgments and their susceptibility to framing effects delivers two interrelated answers. First, as James Andow observes, the substantive influence of morally irrelevant factors on judgments is important because “it is capable of radically altering the moral position that one ends up endorsing” [ 45 , p. 908]. If a person’s judgment about some case is the output of a psychological process that has been substantively influenced by a morally irrelevant factor, then there is a prima facie reason to doubt that judgment.…”

Section: The Debunking Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental philosophical bioethics and normative inference

et al. 2021

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This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” (bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative discipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to substantive ethical questions about what should be done in a given context. What are some of the ways in which this aim has been pursued? In this paper, we employ a case study approach to examine and critically evaluate four strategies from the recent literature by which scholars in bioxphi have leveraged empirical data in the service of normative arguments.

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“…His claim has been enormously influential, both within academia and beyond (also taking hold in industry, government, and the wider public consciousness). Its impact in philosophy is particularly evident in recent debates about the reliability of moral intuitions-see, for example, Andow (2016;; Demaree-Cotton ( 2016 With the far-reaching implications of the prospect-theoretic account in mind, we will now consider how recent empirical and theoretical research has begun to challenge it.…”

Section: Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…His claim has been enormously influential, both within academia and beyond (also taking hold in industry, government, and the wider public consciousness). Its impact in philosophy is particularly evident in recent debates about the reliability of moral intuitions—see, for example, Andow (2016; 2018); Demaree‐Cotton (2016); McDonald et al. (2021); Nado (2014); Sinnott‐Armstrong (2008).…”

Section: Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Risky‐choice framing and rational decision‐making

Fisher

Mandel

2021

Philosophy Compass

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This article surveys the latest research on risky‐choice framing effects, focusing on the implications for rational decision‐making. An influential program of psychological research suggests that people's judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision‐makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision‐making, known as the principle of description invariance. We discuss recent theoretical and empirical research that challenges the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. These approaches typically pay close attention to how decision‐makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice) and they highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle. We conclude by indicating avenues for future research that could bring us closer to a complete—and potentially rationalizing—explanation of framing effects.

show abstract

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Cited by 15 publications

References 32 publications

Risky-choice framing and rational decision-making

Risky-choice framing and rational decision-making

Experimental philosophical bioethics and normative inference

Risky‐choice framing and rational decision‐making

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