Religion as a Commitment Device: The Economics of Political Islam

Abstract

Summary Why are religious parties so popular in the new and emerging democracies of the Middle East and North Africa? This paper offers an alternative to the traditional accounts that stress religiosity, the repressive nature of the previous regimes, poverty and underdevelopment, or Arab grievances against Israel. Instead, it outlines a rational choice‐based explanation, in which religious political parties are able to address the problem of credible commitment, ubiquitous in new democracies. Instead of having to rely on patronage as the only mechanism of making pre‐electoral commitments, Islamic parties are able to directly make credible promises about the supply of public goods. This is because they already have a history and a reputation, which both serve as channels of communication with the voters. Their reputation relies most importantly on a track record of providing social services in environments where governments have failed to do so. Furthermore, we argue that their religious nature makes them well equipped to overcome collective action problems.

The Institutional Foundations of Religious Politics: Evidence from Indonesia

“…While their study draws a connection between growth in piety and the resurgence of Islamism, we find that the two need not be related and may respond to different underlying triggers. 9 This is consistent with Roháč (2013) who argues that voters support Islamists not due to piety but because they offer the only credible commitment to provide public goods. We rule out this reciprocity-based mechanism, finding that public goods are not systematically different in districts with greater expropriation intensity, despite greater prevalence of waqf.…”

Do Islamist parties help or hinder women? Party institutionalization, piety and responsiveness to female citizens

“…Existing literature suggests that Islamist parties are more fully institutionalized than other non‐Islamist parties, allowing them to mobilize and serve citizens at the grassroots, including marginalized citizens who lack access to patronage networks with the state (Cammett & Luong, 2014). To implement their party strategy, Islamist, more than other parties, institutionalize service provision by establishing direct contact with citizens through a network of party and local offices, mosques, social service institutions, and schools (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007; Roháč, 2013; p. 256). This means that they work together, often in party offices where male and female elected officials and staff are present.…”

“…Some theorists claim this constitutes an exchange of favors for votes (Alterman, 2000; Flanigan, 2008; Hamzeh, 2001). Yet Clark (2004b) argues that these activities are different from the traditional clientelistic networks because they are based on “horizontal networks” between group members working toward a common goal: to provide services to citizens to promote the party's goals (Roháč, 2013, p. 267). Islamist parties’ commitment to fairness and their ability to engage easily in direct contact with observant Muslim women encourages female Islamist legislators to respond to the symbolic and service needs of women in their constituencies.…”

Policy credibility and the political economy of reform: the case of Egypt's commodity subsidies

“…See, e.g.,Keefer and Vlaicu (2008). 47Roháč (2013a) points out that it is the religious groups who may potentially have the ability to make credible commitments over policy and public goods provision.…”