Religious authority and the transmission of abstract god concepts

Cofnas, Nathan

doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1409888

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…One potential explanation is that this is a more strongly anthropomorphic conception of the Buddha, in that it allows for the possibility of social interaction with him [75,76], a property which has been claimed to motivate anthropomorphism more generally [77]. This being the case, in order to enforce the counterintuitive notion of a non-agentive Buddha, doctrinal Theravada would have to rely on the strength of religious authorities and institutions dedicated to countering a takeover by more minimally counterintuitive ideas [78,79].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Buddhism and animism: A psychometric test of the structure of Burmese Theravada Buddhism

Stanford

Jong

2019

PLoS ONE

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Anthropologists and religious scholars have long debated the relationship between doctrinal Theravada Buddhism, so-called ‘animism’, and other folk practices in southeast Asian societies. A variety of models of this relationship have been proposed on the basis of ethnographic evidence. We provide the first psychometric and quantitative evaluation of these competing models, using a new scale developed for this purpose, the Burmese Buddhist Religiosity Scale. Having tested existing hypotheses in our first study (n = 2285) we formulated an alternative model, which was then tested in our second study (n = 3377). We argue that this model provides support for a two-dimensional distinction between great and little traditions, shedding light on decades-old theoretical debates. Far from being in conflict, the transnational religious tradition of the literati and the variegated religious practices of locals appear to be reflected in two complementary dimensions of religiosity. This distinction has been heretofore neglected in psychometric research, but arguably merits attention beyond Buddhism, in the psychology of religion more generally. Our findings suggest that, insofar as research on religiosity relies on doctrinal pronouncements denigrating little traditions as mere superstition, it may be blinded to a crucial dimension of religious life.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Buddhism and animism: A psychometric test of the structure of Burmese Theravada Buddhism

Stanford

Jong

2019

PLoS ONE

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“…Similarly, the ambiguous content attributed to religious agents may facilitate motivated reasoning, making it easier to reason toward a belief in these agents. Counterintuitive abilities that can be demonstrated in a variety of ways (violating nonspecific or multiple folk domains), might permit gods to influence manifold situations of motivational significance [24], without precluding or disconfirming their involvement in any [26]. A god’s omnipotence, control of nature, magical powers, or “mysterious ways”, for example, can be applied in whatever manner a believer deems necessary.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Responses to the Mickey Mouse problem have been limited in number and scope. Some authors suggest there is no way to distinguish the content of religious and secular MCI agents, attributing religious belief instead to contextual conditions, such as conformity with cultural norms, mimicry of prestigious and authoritative individuals, and observation of costly displays of commitment that enhance the credibility of the performer’s beliefs [19–24]. This approach is unsatisfying, however, both because religious and nonreligious agents have not been systematically compared on dimensions other than their counterintuitiveness, and because distinctions in terms of “context” only push back explanation one step.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Religious agents’ interest in human affairs may be seen in light of a more general principle: their relevance to human fitness. Religious agents may be encoded and, ultimately, worshipped, because they serve intelligible purposes [24], and perhaps represent a potential threat or benefit to human survival and/or reproductive prospects. Indeed, in prior research, we found that counterintuitive agents both pose a greater threat, and also offer greater opportunity (i.e., hold greater potential benefits) than intuitive agents, and it may be that fitness relevance further distinguishes religious and fictional agents [35].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents

Swan

Halberstadt

2019

PLoS ONE

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The Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a “religious” or a “fictional” agent with five supernatural abilities. Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology or that were ambiguous–violating nonspecific or multiple domains of folk knowledge–and fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology. Similarly, participants rated folk psychology violations provided by the experimenter as more characteristic of religious agents than were violations of folk physics or folk biology, while fictional agents showed no clear pattern. Religious agents were also judged as more potentially beneficial, and more ambivalent (i.e., similar ratings of benefit and harm), than fictional agents, regardless of whether the agents were invented or well-known to participants. Together, the results support a motivational account of religious belief formation that is facilitated by these biases.

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“…The distinction between folkpsychology and folkphysics undoubtedly provides 763 leverage for conceiving of minds as separate from bodies, but this remains counterintuitive. Our 764 behaviors betray embodied conceptions of supernatural beings that conflict with the disembodied 765 conceptions of acquired theology (Slone, 2004), whether it be the stories we tell (Barrett & Keil, 766 1996; Barrett, 1998), the art we make (Hodge, 2008;Nikkel, 2015), the rituals we perform 767 (Astuti & Harris, 2008), or the implicit inferences we draw (Barlev et al, 2017, 2018 Review). Why people hold dual conceptions of supernatural beings and how they coordinate 769 those conceptions are questions in need of further research-questions that promise to shed light 770 not just on religious cognition but on how we reason about minds and bodies more generally.…”

Section: Conceptions 525 24mentioning

confidence: 99%

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Barlev¹,

Shtulman²

2019

Preprint

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Disembodied beings are prevalent in present and past religions, from disembodied gods to invisible spirits to immortal souls. Many scholars have explained this prevalence in terms of a quirk in how we initially conceptualize intentional agents, representing their minds as functionally independent of their bodies. Infants are claimed to have both a folkpsychology (for representing the mental states of intentional agents) and a folkphysics (for representing the properties of physical objects) but apply only the folkpsychology to persons. The two modes of construal become integrated with development, but their functional specialization and initial independence makes it easy for people of all ages to entertain the notion that minds can exist without bodies. We critically evaluate this position by scrutinizing the evidence that infants and young children view human minds as functionally independent of human bodies, as well as the evidence that supernatural beings are intuitively represented as minds without bodies. We review evidence from experimental psychology on the representation of intentional agents, both natural and supernatural, as well as the historical and ethnographic literatures on representations of disembodied beings in religion. We argue that representations of minds and bodies are differentiated but functionally integrated from the start, and that conceiving of minds without bodies requires cultural learning. Belief in disembodied beings may be prevalent not because we are developmentally predisposed to entertain such beliefs but because such beliefs are counterintuitive and thus preferentially remembered and socially transmitted.

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Religious authority and the transmission of abstract god concepts

Cited by 4 publications

References 33 publications

Beyond Buddhism and animism: A psychometric test of the structure of Burmese Theravada Buddhism

Beyond Buddhism and animism: A psychometric test of the structure of Burmese Theravada Buddhism

The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

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