Religious credence is not factual belief

Leeuwen, Neil Van

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.015

Cited by 177 publications

(122 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…For example, it has been argued that such attitudes “inherit” their content from beliefs or desires (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, pp. 18–19; Van Leeuwen, 2014, p. 704).…”

Section: What Is Visual Imagery?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate

Brogaard

Gatzia

2017

Front. Psychol.

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Traditionally, philosophers have appealed to the phenomenological similarity between visual experience and visual imagery to support the hypothesis that there is significant overlap between the perceptual and imaginative domains. The current evidence, however, is inconclusive: while evidence from transcranial brain stimulation seems to support this conclusion, neurophysiological evidence from brain lesion studies (e.g., from patients with brain lesions resulting in a loss of mental imagery but not a corresponding loss of perception and vice versa) indicates that there are functional and anatomical dissociations between mental imagery and perception. Assuming that the mental imagery and perception do not overlap, at least, to the extent traditionally assumed, then the question arises as to what exactly mental imagery is and whether it parallels perception by proceeding via several functionally distinct mechanisms. In this review, we argue that even though there may not be a shared mechanism underlying vision for perception and conscious imagery, there is an overlap between the mechanisms underlying vision for action and unconscious visual imagery. On the basis of these findings, we propose a modification of Kosslyn’s model of imagery that accommodates unconscious imagination and explore possible explanations of the quasi-pictorial phenomenology of conscious visual imagery in light of the fact that its underlying neural substrates and mechanisms typically are distinct from those of visual experience.

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“…For example, it has been argued that such attitudes “inherit” their content from beliefs or desires (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, pp. 18–19; Van Leeuwen, 2014, p. 704).…”

Section: What Is Visual Imagery?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Unconscious Imagination and the Mental Imagery Debate

Brogaard

Gatzia

2017

Front. Psychol.

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“…If we accept the claim that in order to qualify as a belief, a state must occupy certain functional roles-aptness for systematic inference and evidence-sensitivity (Stich, 1978;Van Leeuwen, 2014;Levy, 2015)-then, the first-order state is not a belief, but not in virtue of the agent's attitude to its content. If we accept the claim that in order to qualify as a belief, a state must occupy certain functional roles-aptness for systematic inference and evidence-sensitivity (Stich, 1978;Van Leeuwen, 2014;Levy, 2015)-then, the first-order state is not a belief, but not in virtue of the agent's attitude to its content.…”

Section: Other Accounts: Rivals and Alliesmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…There is also extensive evidence of diachronic conflicts: Religious beliefs often seem to be surprisingly context sensitive (Van Leeuwen, 2014). There is also extensive evidence of diachronic conflicts: Religious beliefs often seem to be surprisingly context sensitive (Van Leeuwen, 2014).…”

Section: Metarepresentations Of Indistinct Propositions Are Commonmentioning

confidence: 99%

You meta believe it

Levy

2018

European J of Philosophy

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Because of the privileged place of beliefs in explaining behaviour, mismatch cases—in which agents sincerely claim to believe that p, but act in a way that is inconsistent with that belief—have attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, I argue that some of these cases, at least, are at least partially explained by agents believing that they believe that p, while failing to believe that p. Agents in these cases do not believe that ~p; rather, they have an indistinct first‐order, beliefy, representation that p. The indistinctness of this first‐order representation provides the leeway for the inconsistency seen in their behaviour.

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“…A predictive processing account needs to concede the possibility that for believers their supernatural beliefs have a different epistemic status than factual beliefs (Van Leeuwen, 2014) and are thus not always subject to prediction error monitoring (and relatedly, in some cases imperfect Bayesian updating could occur; Camerer & Hua Ho, 1999). The Bayesian approach also needs to bridge the gap between so-called low-level perceptual phenomena and more high-level aspects of human cognition and experience.…”

Section: Bayes In the Brain: Theoretical Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%