Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy

May, Simon

doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01153.x

Cited by 20 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…4. I have criticised Rawls's liberal principle in May (2009). For another substantive theory of legitimacy that includes reciprocity as a core democratic value, in addition to equality and political autonomy, see Brettschneider (2007).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic legitimacy, legal expressivism, and religious establishment

May

2012

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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I argue that some instances of constitutional religious establishment can be consistent with an expressivist interpretation of democratic legitimacy. Whether official religious endorsements disparage or exclude religious minorities depends on a number of contextual considerations, including the philosophical content of the religion in question, the attitudes of the majority, and the underlying purpose of the official status of the religious doctrine.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic legitimacy, legal expressivism, and religious establishment

May

2012

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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“…From the Rawlsian standpoint an-Na'im's claim about religious toleration and the secular state is appropriate when we are thinking about the conditions for a just state. Yet as Alfred Stepan (2001) and Simon Cabulea May (2009) The separation of Islam and the state is necessary for Muslims to uphold their genuine beliefs and to live accordingly…Historically, religious leaders were either enticed to cooperate with the political agenda of rulers or coerced to do so to avoid facing harsh consequences, as illustrated by the inquisition….I am calling for the separation of Islam from the state, which means that those who control the state cannot use its coercive powers to enforce their own beliefs. (an-Na'im, 2008: 56).…”

Section: Does Tolerationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toleration and Liberty of Conscience

Mahoney¹

2020

The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration

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This chapter examines some central features to liberal conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience. The first section briefly examines conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience in the traditions of Locke, Rawls, and Mill. The second section considers contemporary controversies surrounding toleration and liberty of conscience with a focus on neutrality and equality. The third section examines several challenges, including whether non-religious values should be afforded the same degree of accommodation as religious values, whether liberty of conscience requires a secular state, and how bias impedes understandings of toleration and liberty of conscience. The chapter concludes with brief comments on future directions for research on toleration and liberty of conscience. One is exploring toleration and liberty of conscience in non-Western contexts; another is exploring ways that varieties of religious and political identity impact conceptions of toleration and liberty of conscience.

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“…One might argue that the ideal of shared political autonomy by free and equal citizens can be realized adequately through a less demanding shared policy, say, one to abide by what Simon May calls the 'democratic principle of legitimacy' (May 2009). 37 According to this principle, 'political power must be exercised within a constitutional order that respects the equal status of all citizens and that effectively guarantees each citizen the basic liberal rights and entitlements necessary to participate in political processes on equal terms' (May 2009, 136).…”

Section: Shared Political Autonomy and The Constrained Proceduralist mentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy

Neufeld

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

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John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.

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Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy

Cited by 20 publications

References 1 publication

Democratic legitimacy, legal expressivism, and religious establishment

Democratic legitimacy, legal expressivism, and religious establishment

Toleration and Liberty of Conscience

Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy

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