Religious pluralism is the view that more than one religion is correct, and that no religion enjoys a special status in relation to the ultimate. Yet the world religions appear to be incompatible. How, then, can more than one be correct? Discussions and critiques of religious pluralism usually focus on the work of John Hick, yet there are a number of other pluralists whose responses to this incompatibility problem are importantly different from Hick's. This article surveys the solutions of Hick, Harrison, Heim, Byrne, and Knitter to the incompatibility problem. I conclude that, while none of these views is without weakness, there are several promising pluralist solutions to this problem. Moreover, confessionalists (i.e. exclusivists and inclusivists) must also address issues related to incompatibility.Religious pluralism 1 is the view that more than one religion is correct, and that no religion enjoys a special status in relation to the ultimate. Religious pluralists (henceforth 'pluralists' unless context demands greater precision) appear to have two central motivations. First, pluralists find value and connectedness with the transcendent in the religious experiences and moral teachings of many established religions. Second, pluralists want to preserve the integrity and dignity of established religions, especially in the context of a history of religious violence, oppression, and colonialism. The various attempts to develop pluralism have been intensely contested both by those who think that they are misguided in intent and by those who think that they fail to be sufficiently pluralistic. In this article, I outline various pluralist responses 2 to one of the main objections to pluralism: the incompatibility problem.The incompatibility problem lies in the fact that the world religions appear to be incompatible, yet religious pluralists assert that more than one of them is correct. Discussions and critiques of religious pluralism usually focus on the work of John Hick, but there are a number of other pluralists whose responses to the incompatibility problem are importantly different from Hick's. Accordingly, this article surveys the solutions of Hick, Harrison, Heim, Byrne, and Knitter. I conclude that, while none of these views is without weakness, there are several promising pluralist solutions to the incompatibility problem. Moreover, those opposing pluralism have an incompatibility problem of their own.