2011
DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2011.565176
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Religious Policy in the People's Republic of China: an alternative perspective

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Cited by 13 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, CCP members cannot be "pure atheists" to start with … Communism, an ideology imported to China in the 1920s, never had a chance to replace the "three pillars" (Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist traditions) of Chinese culture rooted in a deep history.' 42 A similar argument was made by the current Deputy Director Zhao during an interview I conducted during one of my return visits. Having confidence in our friendship, I asked her frankly whether she felt that it was a contradiction as a communist cadre, as well as a state official, to believe deeply in religious matters.…”
Section: Stevementioning
confidence: 58%
“…Therefore, CCP members cannot be "pure atheists" to start with … Communism, an ideology imported to China in the 1920s, never had a chance to replace the "three pillars" (Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist traditions) of Chinese culture rooted in a deep history.' 42 A similar argument was made by the current Deputy Director Zhao during an interview I conducted during one of my return visits. Having confidence in our friendship, I asked her frankly whether she felt that it was a contradiction as a communist cadre, as well as a state official, to believe deeply in religious matters.…”
Section: Stevementioning
confidence: 58%
“…As mentioned, most of these items are from the religion ego‐identity domain. The close supervision and monitoring of religious activities by the Chinese government during the Communist era not only affected the religious identity of Chinese citizens in general, but might also have interfered with the formation of religious identity among university students, even in contemporary mainland China (Qu, ). There is also an increasing phenomenon called Diaosi : loser , especially among the Chinese young generation: a sense of failure due to dissatisfaction and unequal opportunities due to lack of family connections and low socioeconomic background compared with those with more powerful backgrounds (Kan, ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In spite of the formal inscription of religious tolerance, it has been argued that the Party‐state has increasingly tightened control over religious groups, and that “the religious policy and regulation have remained ideology‐driven and have seen no substantial change” (Yang :65). General official announcements and legal documents on religious topics issued by the state have been continuously analyzed to prove the above point (Fällman ; Liu ; MacInnis ; Potter ; Qu ; Spiegel ). Amid its treatment of individual religions in China, the Party‐state has been found to make efforts to consolidate the stability of its authoritative rule by prohibiting religious involvement with possible foreign infiltration, and containing religious development based on atheist ideology (Alles, Cherif‐Chebbi, and Halfon ; Cabezón ; Goldman ; Tang and Wiest ).…”
Section: Mapping Religion‐state Relations In Post‐mao Chinamentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Researchers have deployed an institutional lens in analyzing the state‐led institutionalization and the key role of government‐approved religious associations that connect religious people together under the auspices of state agencies (Gladney ; Goossaert and Palmer :315–58; Laliberté ; Yang ). Others trace the historical origin of this religiopolitical regulative regime to not only the imperial legacy of old China (Bays ; Palmer ; Qu ) but also the unfinished project of imported secularist modernity since the late Qing dynasty and the Republican era (Goossaert and Palmer :19–90; Nedostup ; Yang ).…”
Section: Mapping Religion‐state Relations In Post‐mao Chinamentioning
confidence: 99%