Human shielding occurs through the use of the body—an individual or collective
physical presence—which is not armed and does not rely on the use of force or fire.
Understood as both a means (human shields) and a method (human shielding), shielding is the use of “civilians or other protected persons, whose presence or
movement is aimed or used to render military targets immune from military
operations.” Human shielding raises difficult doctrinal questions as to the
interpretation and implementation of international humanitarian law that are not
easily answered. This is in part because human shielding reanimates a series of
queries that, as I argue elsewhere, are constitutive of international
humanitarian law itself, namely: What and who is a combatant? What and who is a
civilian? Who is to judge and according to which premises? Human shielding reanimates
these questions because it is upon the definition of a civilian, in contradistinction
to the combatant, that the power and efficacy of shielding depends. As I have shown,
the distinction between civilian and combatant is partially constituted through
discourses of gender which naturalize sex and sex difference. These discourses, as
I sketch out below, are cited when theorizing the significance of human shields and
reappear when evaluating the representation and meaning of the embodied movement of
human shields.