This chapter argues that to understand violent conflict more completely, including conflict that is religiously articulated, and to facilitate healing and reconciliation, analysts and practitioners need to seriously consider materiality and things as entry points, as they play a significant role in the immediate onset, escalation, or de-escalation of violent conflicts. Using cases of religiously articulated violence, it interrogates how prioritizing materiality and things illuminates an understanding of violence on the one hand and healing and reconciliation on the other. Focusing on materiality challenges the predilection to overlook the physical and material harm and concentrate only on broader theoretical and conceptual frameworks that are divorced from the victims' lived experiences. Concerning violence in which religion is a factor, the chapter argues that, contrary to the claim that violence is inherent in the beliefs and doctrines of the religious traditions involved, which allegedly prompt their subscribers to cause violence, actors in religiously articulated violence act not on the evoking of abstract ideas or beliefs, but often on the violation of materials and things. Accordingly, materiality and things ought to be seriously considered as entry points to analysing and addressing violent conflict in facilitating healing and reconciliation. However, this is not to suggest that materiality and things instigate violence: indeed, they do not in themselves evoke violence. Instead, it is to argue that it is the violation of things that stakeholders consider dear or sacred that sparks conflict and violence, leading to hurt, woundedness, and trauma. The high priority placed on reparations and the restoration of livelihoods, truth-telling, justice, and apologies in processes of healing and reconciliation indicates that it is the violation of bodies that hurts most. While discourses on reconciliation like forgiveness, coexistence, truth-telling, and healing may be perceived as abstract, moral, and existential questions, the chapter argues that they can only make sense if they are firmly grounded in materiality, that is, in the materiality of people's lived experiences. This approach is distinct from exist-