“…This account of how classification proceeds in science is highly idealized; if natural kinds are ultimately the goal of science, investigations into the nature of scientific practice reveal that classificatory practices and kind discovery in science do not follow this logical trajectory (e.g., Andersen, 2010;Bloch-Mullins, 2020a, 2020b, Chang, 2004Hacking, 1992b;Feest & Steinle, 2012;Kendig, 2016aKendig, , 2016bNersessian, 2008). Numerous philosophers of science and scientists have noted that exploratory and hypothesis-driven research often proceed in science without a firm grasp of what the objects of inquiry are nor how the kinds of things under study fit into some broader taxonomy of kinds (e.g., Anderson, 2015;Brigandt, 2003Brigandt, , 2020Chang, 2004Chang, , 2012Colaço, 2020;Feest, 2005Feest, , 2010Feest, , 2011Feest, , 2012Feest, , 2017Feest & Steinle, 2012;Griffiths, 1997Griffiths, , 2004Haueis & Slaby, 2017;Kendig, 2016aKendig, , 2016bMuszynski & Malaterre 2020;Rheinberger, 1997;Sullivan, 2009, 2017b, Sullivan, 2010Sullivan, 2019;Sullivan, 2020).…”