Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure

French, Steven; Ladyman, James

doi:10.1023/a:1024156116636

Cited by 350 publications

(141 citation statements)

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“…Their motivation, as well as the motivation of this paper, is to avoid being committed to intrinsic properties of which we cannot gain any knowledge insofar as their intrinsic nature is concerned. Nonetheless, in this context, the point of this paper is that in 17 See Ladyman (1998), French and Ladyman (2003).…”

Section: A Moderate Vs a Radical Metaphysics Of Relationsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations

Esfeld

2004

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in

119

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This paper argues for a metaphysics of relations based on a characterization of quantum entanglement in terms of non-separability, thereby regarding entanglement as a sort of holism. By contrast to a radical metaphysics of relations, the position set out in this paper recognizes things that stand in the relations, but claims that, as far as the relations are concerned, there is no need for these things to have qualitative intrinsic properties underlying the relations. This position thus opposes a metaphysics of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties. A principal problem of the latter position is that it seems that we cannot gain any knowledge of these properties insofar as they are intrinsic. Against this background, the rationale behind a metaphysics of relations is to avoid a gap between epistemology and metaphysics. Keywords: entanglement, holism, intrinsic properties, metaphysics, non-separability, relations, structural realism IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to propose a philosophical characterization of quantum entanglement within a broader metaphysical framework. The framework is the one of a metaphysics of relations in contrast to a metaphysics of individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties. A metaphysics of relations is a minority view in contemporary philosophy. According to the mainstream of metaphysical thought, the world consists of independent individual things that are embedded in space-time. These things are individuals, because (a) they have a spatio-temporal location, (b) they are a subject of the predication of properties each and (c) there are some qualitative properties by means of which each of these things is distinguished from all the other ones (at least the spatio-temporal location is such a property). Qualitative properties are all and only those properties whose instantiation does not depend on the existence of any particular individual; properties such as being that individual are hence excluded. These things are independent, because their basic properties are intrinsic ones. Basic properties are fundamental in that they are not reducible to other properties, and they are not disjunctive; that is to say, properties such as "being round or square" are excluded. Intrinsic are all and only those qualitative properties that a thing has irrespective of whether or not there are other contingent things; all other qualitative properties are extrinsic or relational. That is to say: Having or lacking an intrinsic property is independent of accompaniment or loneliness. 1 1 See Langton and Lewis (1998) and for a refinement Lewis (2001).

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Section: A Moderate Vs a Radical Metaphysics Of Relationsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations

Esfeld

2004

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in

119

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show abstract

“…2 I discuss alternatives to the Ramsey approach in 2.2. structure in terms of models. 3 Here, the relevant notion of a model is a mathematical structure (i.e., a domain with relations defined upon it) that can be used to represent the unobservable world. 4 To provide dialectical context for the paper, it will be useful to briefly discuss some of the differences between these two approaches.…”

Section: Alternatives To the Ramsey Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Newman’s Objection and the No Miracles Argument

Smithson

2016

Erkenn

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“…14 Such a distinction might be found elsewhere, including in the philosophy of science. Thus the (ontic) structural realist might insist that 'there are particles' is false, because at the most fundamental level there are no particles qua objects, only structures, whereas 'there are particles' is true, in virtue of the fact that there are structures 'arranged particle shaped' (that is, 'shaped' via the relevant symmetry groups for example; see French and Ladyman 2003).…”

Section: A Fourth Way: Truthmaker Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%