Render unto Caesar: Taxes, charity, and political Islam

Abstract

Data from the first post-Arab Spring elections reveal that support for Islamic parties came from richer districts and individuals. We show that standard public finance arguments help explain the voting pattern in these elections and others in the Muslim world. Our model predicts that a voter's probability to vote for a religious party (i) increases in income for the poorest voters, but possibly decreases in income for the richest; (ii) is greater for voters in richer districts; and (iii) increases with the voter's religiosity. We test these predictions on original micro-level data in a nationally representative sample of 600 individuals in 30 districts in Tunisia. Our empirical results align with our predictions and suggest that belonging to the middle class and living in a richer district together affect voting decisions more than being a religious voter. We also test for other possible factors affecting voting decisions, such as education, or attitudes towards corruption or towards the West. Finally, we document similar patterns in other key elections in the Muslim world.

Infrastructure Provision, Politics and Religion: Insights From Tunisia's New Democracy

“…In the Tunisian context, Fourati et al. () established a link but focused on middle‐class support for the religious party based on its adoption of neo‐liberal economic policies rather than policies designed to improve public services. Our paper differs from Fourati et al.…”

“…The recognition of a link between religion, economics, and politics is not new, as acknowledged by Iyer (2016) and Aldashev and Platteau (2014) in their surveys. In the Tunisian context, Fourati et al (2016) established a link but focused on middle-class support for the religious party based on its adoption of neo-liberal economic policies rather than policies designed to improve public services. Our paper differs from Fourati et al (2016)'s in focusing on the extent to which public service provision is associated with political outcomes, especially support for Islamist parties, which have gained a reputation for prioritizing access to public services (as with Lebanon's Hezbollah or Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood).…”

“…In the Tunisian context, Fourati et al (2016) established a link but focused on middle-class support for the religious party based on its adoption of neo-liberal economic policies rather than policies designed to improve public services. Our paper differs from Fourati et al (2016)'s in focusing on the extent to which public service provision is associated with political outcomes, especially support for Islamist parties, which have gained a reputation for prioritizing access to public services (as with Lebanon's Hezbollah or Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood). The reputed commitment to public services may reflect more than Islamist activism in the region; it may also reflect the traditional concern of the Muslim faith to meet the needs of the poor (Iyer 2016; Kochuyt 2009).…”

“…For more details of the program see: http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Nahda_2011_ summary_in_English.pdf 5 Importantly, in Tunisia and in the region, religious (Islamic) parties originate from religious (Islamic) charities, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, or Hamas and Hezbollah, which operate both as charities and as political parties (Fourati et al 2016;Berman 2009). Hence, the distinction between a religious party and a religious organization is often difficult to make.…”

Introduction to the Special Issue on the Economics of the Middle East and North Africa

“…The second session of the symposium explored the interconnectedness of religious and economic aspects of life in Africa and the Middle East. Fourati et al (2016) consider formal theories of voting for religious parties, and derive predictions that religious party voting follows an inverted-U shape: the share of the population that votes for the religious party increases with income for poorer voters, and decreases with income in the richer part of the income distribution. Overall, this results in a greater share of religious party votes in richer districts.…”