Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation

Kahana, Nava; Klunover, Doron

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.06.003

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…The findings point out that conflict intensities are identically distributed (33.3%) in three levels (medium, high, and very high intensities) (Table 3), which gives a summarized "strong" level (66.6%) indicating a significant opposition to this type of rent seeking. The change from non-contestable to contestable rents (Aidt and Hillman, 2008) due to the excess burden in taxation (Kahana & Klunover, 2014) thus ignited huge protests. Moreover, rent-seeking groups involved in these arbitrary policies are mainly the ones of non-lay institutions (42.8%), then royal administration (28.6%), the ones of rich merchants/corporation masters (14.3%), and municipal councilors (14.3%) (Table 4).…”

Section: Review Of European Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective

Challier¹

2018

RES

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This paper is an empirical analysis to explore the relationships between urban conflict and both rent seeking and corruption. It examines social disturbances in medieval France through a sample of twelve towns examined over the period 1270-1399 in a real context of informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and issues indivisibilities. As regards the economic corruption class, it is found that townspeople rebel more often and more intensely against the extortion of funds carried out by policy makers than against the embezzlement of a part of these funds. As to the political corruption class, the findings highlight that abuse of power against municipalities is identified in more social unrest than influence peddling against these local institutions. Furthermore, it is shown that rent-seeking-related policies (like arbitrary actions limiting property rights, economic rules-based policies, and targeted political measures) have less influence on urban conflict than corrupt policies do. These findings produce insights that apply beyond the historical context and analysis of the paper. Situations presenting over-indebted towns despite overtaxed people disturb also modern democracies.

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Section: Review Of European Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective

Challier¹

2018

RES

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“…Behavioral assumptions (see Sheremeta 2015;Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta 2015) are required for over-dissipation to occur (some type of emotional influence or 2 There can be links between the two sources of social loss. See Kahana and Klunover (2014). 'irrationality' is required for more resources to be attracted to a contest than the value of the rent that is contested).…”

Section: The Social Loss From Contestable Rentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits

Hillman

Long

2017

SSRN Journal

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A major contribution of the public-choice school is the recognition by Gordon Tullock that contestable rents give rise to social losses because of unproductive resource use. Contestable rents usually are politically assigned privileges. Contestable rents can also be found outside of government decisions. We describe the example of rents in academia in different cultures. The primary empirical question regarding rent seeking concerns the magnitude of the social loss from the contesting of rents. Direct measurement is impeded by lack of data and indeed denial that rent seeking took place. Contest models provide guidance regarding social losses. We provide a generalized contest model. Social losses from rent seeking are diminished in highincome democracies because rent seeking usually takes place by groups seeking 'public good' benefits. Rents are also less visible in democracies, because political accountability requires that rents be assigned in indirect non-transparent ways. These restraints are not present in autocracies, where rent seeking is also facilitated by corruption and by the need to influence a smaller number of decision makers. Ideology can influence whether rent seeking is recognized to exist. JEL-Codes: H000.

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“…For surveys of aspects of 'rent seeking' and country case studies, see Congleton and Hillman (2015). 2 Social costs of rent seeking and deadweight losses are often simultaneously present: the interdependence between the two sources of social loss is described by Kahana and Klunover (2014). Mainstream normative theory recognized deadweight losses from redistribution (although the deadweight losses were often assumed away by proposing 'lump-sum' taxes and subsidies).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Where are the rent seekers?

Hillman

Ursprung

2016

Const Polit Econ

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In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question 'where are the rent seekers?' Tullock proposed that political accountability and 'free-riding' incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock's explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock's concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock's model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.

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Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation

Cited by 8 publications

References 47 publications

Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective

Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective

Rent Seeking: The Social Cost of Contestable Benefits

Where are the rent seekers?

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