Rent-seeking for pure public goods

Katz, Eliakim; Nitzan, Shmuel; Rosenberg, Jacob

doi:10.1007/bf00139290

Cited by 249 publications

(156 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The first attempts to address inter-group conflict as well as intra-group conflict were made by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and Katz et al (1990). The pioneering study by Katz et al (1990), which is built on the original Tullock contest, demonstrates that the effort expended by a group depends on individual valuations of the prize and not on the size of the group.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Sheremeta

2009

SSRN Journal

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This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium.JEL Classifications: C71, C72, C91, C92, D72, H41

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Sheremeta

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…Proposition 4.3 is due to Katz et al (1990), see also Nti (1998). The conclusion is that, contrary to Olson's conjecture, the success of small groups cannot be traced to the larger effort made by their members.…”

Section: Proposition 43 Assume (H ) Identical Valuations and Costs mentioning

confidence: 86%

The theory of contests: a survey

Corchón

2007

Rev. Econ. Design

190

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“…Katz et al 1990) is the publicness of grants received, i.e. how large share is spent on public goods valued by all constituents in a local government.…”

Section: Other Theoretical Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Lobbying in Politics: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Sweden

Liang

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper first formulates a model of how the politicians in a local government collectively lobby to raise intergovernmental grants to their local government. The model identifies a relationship between council size and grants received. I then study this relationship empirically using the distribution of intergovernmental grants to the Swedish local governments. I use a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design that exploits a council size law to isolate exogenous variation in council size and find a large negative council size effect. This pattern provides indirect evidence for the occurrence of lobbying. The direction of the effect could be explained by free-riding incentives in individual lobbying effort contribution caused by a collective action problem in grant-raising among local government politicians.

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Rent-seeking for pure public goods

Cited by 249 publications

References 10 publications

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests Between Groups

The theory of contests: a survey

Collective Lobbying in Politics: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Sweden

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