Rente und subnationale Gewalt. Der Beitrag der politischen Ökonomie

Abstract

Rents are a basic element of the political economy of underdeveloped economies. They hinder and often block the mechanism of social integration through gainful employment and veto the power of labour, which characterizes capitalist societies and the constitution of citizenship. The impact of rent on political structures is, however, ambiguous. Anomie is only one possible result. Hence the link between raw material exports and non-state violence is also ambiguous. Many societies, which are characterized by rents, have developed quite powerful mechanisms of keeping internal peace, possibly with limited participation. The conditions of differential impacts of rent on social structures and political behaviour call for an analysis of internal interest mediation. This research is, however, blocked by an ideological commitment of turf-defending German mainstream constructivism in international relations against the consideration of the political implications of rent because of its dual opposition against political economy and sociological realism in the behaviour of social groups.