Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement in Industrializing Countries

McAllister, Lesley K.; Rooij, Benjamin van; Kagan, Robert A.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2009.00314.x

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…In the Global South, environmental governmental regulators are often obstructed in their enforcement work by a lack of independence and capacity, while having to face widespread and structural non-compliance (McAllister et al 2010). An important way to deal with these implementation challenges has been to diversify regulatory actors and mechanisms to circumvent and bolster faltering governmental regulators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retracted: Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

2014

Regulation & Governance

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Brazil's successful prosecutorial civil action against polluters could be a regulatory example for the Global South. This paper analyses whether such regulation could also develop without the major political, institutional, and legal reforms that spurred it in Brazil. To do so, it analyzes China, where similar reforms have so far not occurred, but where prosecutors have recently started to initiate civil litigation against polluters. It finds that prosecutorial civil litigation in China has only a limited regulatory effect or potential. Prosecutors in China are influenced by conflicting incentive structures that reward one-off lower level test cases with an innovation bonus, while structurally stimulating a focus on general crime fighting. Ironically, as a result of such incentives, the recent legal reform, toward providing standing for prosecutors in public interest litigation, will, in contrast to Brazil, decrease rather than increase the regulatory effect of these cases. These findings have implications for understanding how the interaction between regulatory independence, legal reform, and regime type shapes possibilities for regulatory innovation in the Global South.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retracted: Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

2014

Regulation & Governance

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“…Evidence from studies on employment policies, social protection, public health, and taxation offer rather moderate appraisals regarding the capacity of soft policy instruments to achieve tangible goals and bring about policy change (Hervey 2008;Kröger 2008;Scott & Trubek 2002). This seems to be even more the case in countries with rather weak regulatory capacities, such as the southern and eastern EU members (O'Hagan 2004;Börzel 2009) or non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) states (McAllister et al 2010;Van Rooij 2010). Recent studies cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of soft policy instruments, particularly with regard to fostering member state regulatory capacity, pointing to the need for hard regulation to make soft regulation work (Héritier & Lehmkuhl 2008;Börzel 2009;Héritier & Rhodes forthcoming).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When soft regulation is not enough: The integrated pollution prevention and control directive of the European Union

Koutalakis

Buzogány

Börzel

2010

Regulation &Amp; Governance

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Recent debates regarding the effectiveness of regulatory policymaking in the European Union (EU) focus on the merits of soft, non‐binding forms of regulation between public and private actors. The emergence of less coercive forms of regulation is analyzed as a response to powerful functional pressures emanating from the complexity of regulatory issues, as well as the need to secure flexibility and adaptability of regulation to distinctive territorial economic, environmental, administrative, and social conditions. In this article we empirically assess the above normative claims regarding the effectiveness of soft regulation vis‐à‐vis uniformly binding legislation. We draw on an exploratory investigation of the application of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive of the EU in four countries. Our study reveals that effectiveness in the application of soft policy instruments is largely contingent upon strong cognitive, material, and political capacities of both state regulators and industrial actors involved in regulatory policymaking. In the absence of those conditions, the application of soft, legally non‐binding regulation may lead to adverse effects, such as non‐compliance and the “hollowing out” of the systems of environmental permits to industry. In the medium term, such developments can undermine the normative authority of the EU.

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“…According to Yip and Tran () and Gainsborough (), state capacity in Vietnam appears to be strong in some areas, but weak in others, notably environmental governance. As with many other developing countries, environmental agencies in Vietnam lack critical resources, including qualified staff, technical equipment, coordinating capacity and the authority to enforce compliance with environmental laws and regulations (Wang et al ., ; McAllister et al ., ). Besides, local officials may be unprepared to conform to the demands of higher authorities over those of local populations, with whom their own political fortunes lie.…”

Section: Environmental Governance and Craft Villagesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Between ‘state’ and ‘society’: Commune authorities and the environment in Vietnam's craft villages

Mahanty

Dang

2015

Asia Pac Viewp

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Maintaining a liveable environment in Vietnam's polluted craft villages is a daily challenge for state authorities and residents. Neighbouring urban populations demand that the state effectively curtails and manages pollution, while local residents prioritise their livelihoods and routinely flout regulations. The commune official, tasked with the seemingly impossible task of environmental regulation, occupies a fraught position, torn between the imperatives and constraints of craft producers and state regulatory demands. This study of water pollution in northern Vietnam's craft villages finds that commune officials' conflicted role in environmental governance is a central factor in the failure of the current environmental governance regime, and reflects the internally conflicted nature of the Vietnamese state.

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Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement in Industrializing Countries

Cited by 14 publications

References 42 publications

Retracted: Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

Retracted: Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

When soft regulation is not enough: The integrated pollution prevention and control directive of the European Union

Between ‘state’ and ‘society’: Commune authorities and the environment in Vietnam's craft villages

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