Repeated Auctions with Complementarities

Hoen, Pieter Jan't; Poutré, J.A.

doi:10.1007/11888727_2

Cited by 7 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The readers can consult work by (some of) the authors of this paper which presents and evaluates such strategies, at a more abstract level, in 't Hoen et al (2005), , Mous, Robu, and La Poutré (2008) and 't Hoen and La Poutré (2006). Rather, our goal in this project is to build an environment which directly models current business practice in transportation logistics (more specifically, a real business case provided by Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen) and in which different analytically-developed strategies can be adapted and tested.…”

Section: Goals Of This Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics

Robu

Noot

Poutré

et al. 2011

Expert Systems with Applications

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a b s t r a c tThis paper describes an agent-based platform for the allocation of loads in distributed transportation logistics, developed as a collaboration between CWI, Dutch National Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam and Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.The platform follows a real business scenario proposed by Vos, and it involves a set of agents bidding for transportation loads to be distributed from a central depot in the Netherlands to different locations across Germany. The platform supports both human agents (i.e. transportation planners), who can bid through specialized planning and bidding interfaces, as well as automated, software agents. We exemplify how the proposed platform can be used to test both the bidding behaviour of human logistics planners, as well as the performance of automated auction bidding strategies, developed for such settings.The paper first introduces the business problem setting and then describes the architecture and main characteristics of our auction platform. We conclude with a preliminary discussion of our experience from a human bidding experiment, involving Vos planners competing for orders both against each other and against some (simple) automated strategies.

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Section: Goals Of This Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…multiple one-day return trips). Other, more advance functionality could be built into the platform, such as support for combinatorial bidding (Sandholm, 2002) or allowing the possibility of decommitment for loads already acquired (a possibility analytically studied by us in 't Hoen et al (2005)). …”

Section: Industrial Adoption Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics

Robu

Noot

Poutré

et al. 2011

Expert Systems with Applications

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“…As previous shown in [18,4,8,21], the main problem that a bidder has to face in a sequential (or simultaneous ascending) auction is the exposure problem. Informally stated, exposure means that an agent has to commit to buying an item (and thus take a "sunk" cost [18]), before she can be sure that she will able to secure other items in her useful set or bundle (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their result applies, however, only to risk neutral agents. Hoen et al '05 [21] look at the related problem of bidding in repeated auctions with complementarities and draw a parallel with the N-person iterated prisoner's dilemma.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Designing Risk-Averse Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions for Transportation Orders

Robu

Poutré

2009

Advances in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiations

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Designing efficient bidding strategies for agents participating in multiple, sequential auctions remains an important challenge for researchers in agentmediated electronic markets. The problem is particularly hard if the bidding agents have complementary (i.e. super-additive) utilities for the items being auctioned, such as is often the case in distributed transportation logistics. This paper studies the effect that a bidding agent's attitude towards taking risks plays in her optimal, decision-theoretic bidding strategy. We model the sequential bidding decision process as an MDP and we analyze, for a category of expectations of future price distributions, the effect that a bidder's risk aversion profile has on her decision-theoretic optimal bidding policy. Next, we simulate the above strategies, and we study the effect that an agent's risk aversion has on the chances of winning the desired items, as well as on the market efficiency and expected seller revenue. The paper extends the results presented in our previous work (reported in [19]), not only by providing additional details regarding the analytical part, but also by considering a more complex and realistic market setting for the simulations. This simulation setting is based on a real transportation logistics scenario [20]), in which bidders have to choose between several combinations (bundles) of orders that can be contracted for transportation.

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“…This certainly is the case in sequential transportation procurement auctions, where bundles form efficient routes consisting of multiple pickup and/or delivery locations. This issue is illustrated in ('t Hoen and La Poutré, 2006). They show, through experiments and game theoretical analysis, that one can benefit from deviation from the true valuation, i.e., the immediate valuation of this single item.…”

Section: Market Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential auctions for full truckload allocation

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Repeated Auctions with Complementarities

Cited by 7 publications

References 7 publications

A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics

A multi-agent platform for auction-based allocation of loads in transportation logistics

Designing Risk-Averse Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions for Transportation Orders

Sequential auctions for full truckload allocation

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